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Machine Rules. Of Drones, Robots, and the  
Info-Capitalist Society 
Guido Noto La Diega* 
Abstract 
Italy has been one of the first countries in the world to enact ad hoc regulations on 
drones. Therefore, the Italian approach may constitute a model for many regulations to 
come; nonetheless, the legal literature seems to overlook the phenomenon. In this article, 
I place the discourse on drones in the context of some more general considerations on the 
main legal issues related to the deployment of machines, including robots, in our 
everyday life. Indeed, most considerations apply equally to robots and drones, moving 
from the unrefined, albeit practical, observation that the latter are robots equipped with 
wings. An analysis of the intellectual property, data protection, privacy, and liability 
issues is carried out bearing in mind the complexity arising from the increasing 
implementation of cloud computing and artificial intelligence technologies. The article 
claims that autonomous machines will outclass human beings in all their tasks, but the 
horror vacui ought to be avoided: a new unforeseeable society will come. Therein, 
human beings – granted that a distinction between them and machines will still make 
sense – will not have to work in order to be able to live. 
Wiederum aber steigt aus der Zerstörung neuer 
schöpferischer Geist empor; der Mangel an Holz und die 
Notdurft des täglichen Lebens drängten auf die hin, 
drängten auf die Auffindung oder die Erfindung von 
Ersatzstoffen für das Holz hin, drängten zur Nutzung der 
Steinkohle als Heizmaterial, drängten zur Erfindung des 
Kokesverfahrens bei der Eisenbereitung. Daß dieses aber 
die ganze Großartige Entwicklung des Kapitalismus im 
19. Jahrhundert erst möglich gemacht hat, steht für 
jeden Kundigen außer Zweifel.  
 
W. Sombart, Krieg und Kapitalismus  
(Barsinghausen: Unikum-Verlag, 2013), 207. 
 
 
 
* Lecturer in Law (tenured), Northumbria University; President of Ital-IoT. This article 
would have not been possible without the valuable collaboration with the fellows of the Nexa 
Center for Internet & Society within the ‘The Law of Service Robots’ project, generously 
supported by Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM). I am grateful to Ms Susanna Crispino (Second 
University of Naples) for the excellent work of preparatory research. The responsibility for this 
article and the errors therein are, however, solely mine. 
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I. Introduction 
It has been a while since the Count de Jonval, assertedly moving from 
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz’s and Giovanni Alfonso Borelli’s theories,1 said 
that  
‘la machine creuse qu’il faudroit imaginer pour soûtenir le corps de 
l’homme, & le mettre en équilibre avec l’air, seroit si démesurément 
grande & embarassante, que le gouvernement & l’usage en ont paru à 
d’habile gens des choses totalment despérées, & aussi interdites à 
l’homme aussi que le mouvement perpétuel.’2  
Not only men have flown,3 but today they can make use of drones, so 
that they can fly and explore the world while sitting on a sofa. 
Italy has been one of the first countries in the world to enact ad hoc 
regulations4 on remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS).5 Therefore, the 
 
1 In a scholium, N.-A. Pluche, Le spectacle de la nature, ou Entretiens sur le particularités 
de l’histoire naturelle (Amsterdam, I, 1, 1741), 291, attributes the idea to Giovanni Alfonso Borelli 
and to the famous thinker of Leipzig. In the English edition Id, Nature Delineated (London, 
1740), 177, there is no mention to Borelli, but Leibniz himself clarified, in 1686, that he owed 
much to the Neapolitan scientist, who had anticipated him in this field. See, in particular, G.A. 
Borelli, De vi percussionis (Bologna, 1667), 279, proposition 116, on ‘il metodo della estimazion 
delle forze pe’ quadrati delle velocità’ (cf F. Colangelo, Storia dei filosofi e dei matematici 
napolitani, e delle loro dottrine (Napoli, III, 1834), 291). One could agree with P. Napoli-
Signorelli, Vicende della coltura nelle due Sicilie. Dalla venuta delle Colonie straniere sino a’ 
nostri giorni (Napoli, V, 1811), 339, whereby the original work ‘De motu animalium’ positions 
Borelli above the philosofers of his time: he belongs to the most excellent circle of Kepler, 
Galileo, Leibniz, and Newton. 
2 N.-A. Pluche, Le spectacle n 1 above, 291-292. 
3 The analogy is justified also from a historical point of view. In order to build the first 
airplane, the Wright brothers tested their ideas by using remotely piloted gliders (see for 
instance R. Freedman, The Wright Brothers: How They Invented the Airplane (New York: 
Holiday House, 1991), 31). 
4 Ente Nazionale per l’Aviazione Civile (ENAC), Regolamento ‘Mezzi aerei a pilotaggio 
remoto’, 2nd ed, 16 July 2015 as amended on 21 December 2015 (hereinafter also ‘regolamento 
ENAC’ or ‘regolamento’). The first edition had been adopted by ENAC, Consiglio di 
Amministrazione, delibera no 42 of 16 December 2013. A courtesy English translation is 
available at https://www.enac.gov.it/repository/ContentManagement/information/N1220929 
004/Regulation_RPAS_Issue_2_Rev%201_eng_0203.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016). 
See also the lettera no 136156/CRT of 29 December 2015, available at https://www.enac.gov.it 
/repository/ContentManagement/information/N353070060/136156_CRT-Chiarimenti.pdf 
(last visited 6 December 2016); the draft guidelines on ‘qualificazione del personale di volo 
APR’ (delibera 22 May 2014 no 1 and the ‘Nota esplicativa ai fini della presentazione della 
dichiarazione o autorizzazione’ of 26 May 2014). 
5 Drones are also known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), remotely piloted aerial 
vehicles (RPAV), remotely piloted aircrafts (RPA) and unmanned aircraft system (UAS). ENAC, 
the Italian regulator of civil aviation, calls them ‘mezzi aerei a pilotaggio remoto’, translated, 
rather approximately, as RPAVs. The single aircraft is referred to as RPA. However, UASs 
(endorsed by ISO, see ISO/TC 20/SC16) and UAVs are to be considered as the genus, RPAVs 
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Italian approach may constitute a model for many regulations to come; 
nonetheless, the legal literature seems to overlook the phenomenon.6  
In this article, I attempt to place the discourse on drones in the context 
of more general considerations of the main legal issues related to the 
deployment of machines, including robots, in our everyday life. 
Most considerations apply equally to robots and drones, moving from the 
unrefined, albeit practical, observation that the latter are robots equipped with 
wings.7 The study of data protection, privacy, and liability will be carried 
out,8 bearing in mind the complexity arising from the increasing use of cloud 
computing (cloud robotics), machine learning, and other artificial intelligence 
(AI) technologies.9  
Machines are indeed an ordinary topic in the news.10 Unfortunately, 
 
and RPASs as the species, and drones as the customary term in common language. 
6 In Italy, before the adoption of the ENAC regulations, a notable exception was constituted 
by U. La Torre, ‘La navigazione degli UAV: un’occasione di riflessione sull’art. 965 c.nav. in 
tema di danni a terzi sulla superficie’ Rivista del diritto della navigazione, I, 553 (2012); B. 
Franchi, ‘Aeromobili senza pilota (UAV): inquadramento giuridico e profile di responsabilità 
(prima parte)’ Responsabilità civile e previdenza, 732 (2010); Id, ‘Aeromobili senza pilota 
(UAV): inquadramento giuridico e profili di responsabilità (seconda parte)’ Responsabilità 
civile e previdenza, 1213 (2010); Id, ‘Gli aeromobili a pilotaggio remoto: profili normativi e 
assicurativi’ Responsabilità civile e previdenza, VI, 1770 (2014). In the matter of robots, one 
can find a slightly clearer field thanks to U. Pagallo (see, eg, Id, ‘Robots in the Cloud with 
Privacy: A New Threat to Data Protection?’ 29 Computer Law & Security Review, 501 (2013)). 
Cf also C. Artusio and M.A. Senor eds, ‘The Law of Service Robots. Ricognizione dell’assetto 
normativo rilevante nell’ambito della robotica di servizio: stato dell’arte e prime raccomandazioni 
di policy in una prospettiva multidisciplinare’ 4 December 2015, available at http://nexa.polito. 
it/nexacenterfiles/robots-2015.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016); A. Santosuosso et al, ‘Robot 
e diritto: una prima ricognizione’ Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata, II, 494 (2012). 
7 I will point out below that most mistakenly think that drones constitute a higher danger for 
privacy, if compared to robots. Moreover, the provisions of the codice della navigazione (regio 
decreto 30 March 1942 no 327, navigation code) apply to drones and not to robots. In general, 
since the drone is a species of the genus robot, all the provisions relevant for the latter apply to 
the former, but not necessarily the other way around. 
8 Some legal issues will be overlooked, especially those emerging from the perspective of 
rights of robots and legal personality (issues that are becoming critical due to the developments 
of AI). Cf C. Sarzana di S. Ippolito, ‘I riflessi giuridici delle nuove tecnologie informatiche’ 
Diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica, III, 505 (1994); P. McNally and S. Inayatullah, 
‘The Rights of Robots: Technology, Culture and Law in the 21st Century’ 20(2) Futures, 119 
(1988); H. Putnam, Mente, linguaggio e realtà (Milano: Adelphi, 1987), 426; S. Gozzano, ‘I 
cinque sensi dei robot. Percezioni artificiali: l’informatica non imita solo l’intelligenza ma anche 
le capacità sensoriali’ Sapere, IV, 9 (1990). 
9 In G. Noto La Diega, ‘The Internet of Citizens. A Lawyer’s View on Some Technological 
Developments in the United Kingdom and India’ Indian Journal of Law & Technology 
(forthcoming), I suggest using Thing instead of smart device, smart home, etc, for at least two 
reasons that apply also to the phrase artificial intelligence. Firstly, most new products are 
designed with smart capabilities; thus if everything is smart, nothing is. Secondly, smartness 
and intelligence are human attributes and one does not want to commit the epistemological 
crime named anthropocentricism. 
10 It would be impossible to give account of the most recent news on drones, but by 
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there is also some sad news. For instance, in the wars carried out by the US 
against Pakistan and Yemen, in the failed attempt to kill forty-one targeted 
individuals, drones have killed one thousand one hundred forty-seven innocent 
people.11 
Now, the law is characterised by an increasingly central role played by 
facts, in the sense that there is ‘an extreme virulence of facts, which have the 
vigour to affect the law and shape it.’12 Therefore, the factual importance of 
machines is already in itself sufficient to justify some legal considerations on 
the topic. This is a task that cannot be delayed any longer, since the 
regolamento of the Ente Nazionale per l’Aviazione Civile (ENAC) has come 
into force.13 Machines stand amongst us and are here to stay. 
The focus of this article will be on intellectual property, data protection, 
privacy, and liability, but it is clear that there are numerous legal issues 
emerging from the deployment of robots and drones, which shall be the 
subject of future research from a comparative perspective.14 
 
 
II. Scope of the Study and Methodological Caveats 
Before going into detailed legal analysis, one ought to define the scope of 
the investigation and to justify a methodology that appears heterodox from a 
traditional civil law approach. 
Since drones are a species of the genus robot, one ought to define the 
 
analysing the press, one notes a trend: drones are increasingly coupled with other protagonists 
of the Internet of Things. See, for instance, the research of the Aerial Robotics Lab (Imperial 
College London, http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/aerialrobotics, last visited 6 December 2016) 
that has led to the creation of a hexacopter, which 3D-prints while flying. R. Moro Visconti, 
‘Valutazione dei Big data e impatto su innovazione e digital branding’ Il diritto industriale, I, 
46, 47 (2016) considers robotics and avionic systems as the first species of the Internet of Things. 
11 Cf Reprieve, ‘You Never Die Twice. Multiple Kills in the US Drone Program’ 25 
November 2014, available at http://www.reprieve.org/wp-content/uploads/2014_11_24_PUB-
You-Never-Die-Twice-Multiple-Kills-in-the-US-Drone-Program-1.pdf (last visited 6 December 
2016). Less tragically, it is not rare to hear of falling drones, as one may want to ask the world 
cup skier Marcel Hirscher. 
12 P. Grossi, ‘Sulla odierna fattualità del diritto’ Giustizia civile, I, 13 (2014). 
13 Even though legal scholars have generally overlooked robotics, one should mention the 
monographic contributions of R. Calo, A.M. Froomkin and I. Kerr eds, Robot Law (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2016) and U. Pagallo, The Laws of Robots: Crimes, Contracts, and Torts 
(Dordrecth-Heidleberg-New York-London: Springer, 2013), as well as C. Holder et al, 
‘Robotics and Law: Key legal and Regulatory Implications of the Robotics Age (Part I of II)’ 32 
Computer Law & Security Review, 383 (2016).  
14 For instance, on 21 June 2016, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) adopted 
the first operational rules for routine commercial use of small unmanned aircraft systems. The 
Advisory Circular 21 June 2016 no 107-2 ‘Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS)’ is 
available at http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_107-2.pdf 
(last visited 6 December 2016). It would be interesting to compare the ENAC regulations with 
those of the US FAA, as well as with those in the UK. 
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latter.15 Following the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
definition, a robot is an ‘actuated mechanism programmable in two or 
more axes with a degree of autonomy, moving within its environment, to 
perform intended tasks’.16 A robot includes the control system and interface 
of the control system. ISO classifies robots into industrial robot and service 
robot; the former will not be the object of this article.  
There are several robotic taxonomies. For instance, some argue that the 
main characteristics of a robot are interactivity, autonomy, and adaptability.17 
To be precise, interactivity is not an intrinsic characteristic of all robots, but 
only of the collaborative ones,18 while adaptability applies to intelligent 
robots.19 It would seem, consequently, that the core concept, the one 
ontologically attached to all the robots, is autonomy; that is, the ‘ability to 
perform intended tasks based on current state and sensing, without human 
intervention.’20 What is happening with machine learning, predictive 
analytics, etc, is a switch of paradigm. In a bizarre return to the original 
meaning of the word, autonomy is not only the capability of acting without 
human intervention; it means the power to dictate laws to oneself, with clear 
consequences for the human beings interacting with the machine. Even 
though not every robot and drone is genuinely autonomous, notwithstanding 
some Artificial Intelligence (AI) fiascoes,21 one cannot deny the spread of AI 
algorithms made possible by the processing capability of cloud robotics.  
 
15 According to P. Comanducci, ‘Le tre leggi della robotica e l’insegnamento della filosofia 
del diritto’ Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, I, 193 (2006), the laws have been 
first conceived by I. Asimov, Runaround (New York: Street and Smith Publications, 1942). U. 
Pagallo, ‘Ermeneuti, visionari, circospetti: La “quarta via” alla robotica tra diritto e letteratura’, 
in M.P. Mittica ed, Diritto e narrazioni. Temi di diritto, letteratura e altre arti (Milano: 
Ledizioni, 2011), 159, considered it as a ‘primo, suggestivo elemento di raccordo tra diritto, 
letteratura e robotica.’ 
16 ISO 8373:2012(en) Robots and robotic devices — Vocabulary, para 2.6. Cf UN World 
Robotics, Statistics, Market Analysis, Forecasts, Case Studies and Profitability of Robot 
Investment (Geneva: UN Economic Commission for Europe e International Federation of 
Robotics, 2005), 21. 
17 C. Allen et al, ‘Prolegomena to Any Future Artificial Moral Agent’ 12 Journal of 
Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 251 (2000). 
18 Collaborative robots are those designed for direct interaction with a human (ISO 8373: 
2012, n 16 above, para 2.26). 
19 An ‘intelligent robot’ is, indeed, ‘capable of performing tasks by sensing its environment 
and/or interacting with external sources and adapting its behaviour.’ (ISO 8373:2012, n 16 
above, para 2.28). ISO makes the examples of an industrial robot with vision sensor to pick 
and place an object; a mobile robot with collision avoidance; and a legged robot walking over 
uneven terrain. 
20 ISO 8373:2012, n 16 above, para 2.2. 
21 B. Fung, ‘Why Microsoft’s racist Twitter bot should make us fear human nature, not 
A.I.’ 24 March 2016 available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016 
/03/24/why-microsofts-racist-twitter-bot-should-make-us-fear-human-nature-not-a-i/ (last 
visited 6 December 2016). As to self-driving cars, see https://static.googleusercontent.com/medi 
a/www.google.com/it//selfdrivingcar/files/reports/report-0216.pdf (last visited 6 December 
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The bridge between robots and drones is the category of mobile robots. 
These machines are ‘able to travel under (their) own control’22 and can well 
encompass aerial mobility. 
Drones are no longer limited to remotely piloted and radio-controlled 
aerial systems used for military purposes.23 Alongside the military drones, 
popularised during the Gulf War,24 one has ‘all sorts and sizes of radio 
controlled, remotely piloted, semi-autonomous or fully autonomous aircraft, 
including hobbyist, radio controlled airplanes.’25 Sometimes they serve the 
public interest, as in the green use in the Terra dei Fuochi26 or the cargo-
drones that transport medicines to Africa.27 Nonetheless, one should not be 
 
2016).  
22 ISO 8373:2012, n16 above, para 2.13. 
23 Even though, when thinking military machines, drones come to mind first, robots are 
also significantly used for military purposes. For instance, on 7 July 2016 the Dallas Police 
Department used a bomb-disposal robot to kill one of the shooters involved in the killing of five 
law enforcement officers. 
24 ENAC has no jurisdiction over military drones. Art 15 of decreto ministeriale 16 
January 2013 (‘Struttura del Segretariato generale, delle Direzioni generali e degli Uffici 
centrali del Ministero della difesa, in attuazione dell’articolo 113, comma 4 del decreto del 
Presidente della Repubblica 15 Marzo 2010 no 90, recante il testo unico delle disposizioni 
regolamentari in materia di ordinamento militare’), reads that the Direzione degli 
armamenti aeronautici (ARMAEREO) is responsible for authorising the navigation of military 
aircrafts. Before the regolamento ENAC, nearly all the Italian provisions on drones dealt with 
the phenomenon from a military perspective. One need only think to Art 1 para 1 of the decreto 
del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 30 November 2012 no 253 (‘Regolamento recante 
individuazione delle attività di rilevanza strategica per il sistema di difesa e sicurezza 
nazionale’), whereby the study, research, design, development, production, and integration of 
velivoli a pilotaggio remoto (remotely-piloted aerial means) both for surveillance (UAV MALE) 
and for attack (UCAV) are considered as activities which are of strategic relevance for the 
defence and national security system (therefore, business operating in the field of military 
drones are bound to Art 1, decreto legge 15 March 2012 no 21 converted by legge 11 May 2012 
no 56; cf Art 1 para 1 letter b) no 3 of the decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 6 
June 2014 no 108). The Italian legislature has discovered drones with the legge 14 July 2004 
no 178 ‘Disposizioni in materia di aeromobili a pilotaggio remoto delle Forze armate’, 
repealed by Art 2268 para 1 no 1027 of decreto legislativo 15 March 2010 no 66 (Codice 
dell’ordinamento militare). The said codice has introduced the ad hoc provisions of the codice 
dell’ordinamento militare, which will be touched on below.  
25 T.T. Takahashi, ‘Drones and Privacy’ Columbia Science & Technology Law Review, 83 
(2012), who refers to J. Ukman, ‘Privacy Group Seeks to Lift Veil on Domestic Drones’ 
Washington Post, 13 January 2012. 
26 As pointed out in G. Noto La Diega, ‘Il cloud computing. Alla ricerca del diritto perduto 
nel web 3.0’ Europa e diritto privato, II, 577, 631 (2014), the decentralised legislatures 
(Regioni) show to be more sensitive to new technologies, in comparison to the central one. It is 
the case of Art 8 para 2 of the legge regionale Campania 9 December 2013 no 20 (‘Misure 
straordinarie per la prevenzione e la lotta al fenomeno dell’abbandono e dei roghi di rifiuti’), 
which promotes agreements with the defence corps aimed to develop programs of environmental 
monitoring; these agreements have to provide the use of innovative technologies, included RPAs. 
27 On ‘The Flying Donkey Challenge’ project, see http://www.flyingdonkey.org/ (last 
visited 6 December 2016).  
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naïve, since the military use is still the main use, as suggested, inter alia, by 
the fact that the first commercial drone has been approved by the US Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) fairly recently and its first flight was in June 
2014.28  
The same applies to robots, which are mainly used for military and 
industrial purposes29 and are thus ignored by most scholars. However, 
today’s drones and ‘robot(s) leave the factory floor and battlefield and enter 
the public and private sphere in meaningful numbers’,30 and the phenomenon 
will affect society even more than computers.31 Therefore, a thorough analysis 
of machine rules is long overdue. 
In Italy, Art 743 of the codice della navigazione,32 as amended by the 
decreto legislativo 15 March 2006 no 151,33 included in the concept of 
aeromobile (aircraft):  
‘Aircraft shall mean any machine designed for the transportation by 
air of persons or property. Remotely piloted aerial vehicles are also 
considered aircraft, as defined by special laws, ENAC regulations and, 
for the military, by decrees of the Ministry of Defence. The distinctions of 
the aircraft, according to their technical specifications and use shall be 
established by ENAC with its regulations and, in any case, by special 
 
28 The Puma AE drone of AeroVironment Inc monitors BP Exploration Inc’s oil pipelines 
in Alaska as from 8 June 2014 (see the licence of 19 July 2013). 
29 Cf the decreto ministeriale 7 May 2014 (Ministero della Difesa) on the ‘Approvazione del 
nuovo elenco dei materiali d’armamento da comprendere nelle categorie previste dall’articolo 
2, comma 2, della legge 9 luglio 1990 no 185, in attuazione della direttiva 2014/18/UE.’ It 
regards also robots and the relevant component, provided that they have at least one of the 
following characteristics: 1. Built for military purposes. 2. Equipped with idraulic junctions 
resistant to perforations cause by balistic framents and designed for fluids having an inflamation 
point superior to eight hundred thirty-nine K (five hundred sixty-six°C); or 3. Designed for or 
apt to function in an environment with electromagnetic pulses (Annex, category 17, letter e). 
30 R. Calo, ‘Robots and Privacy’, in P. Lin et al eds, Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social 
Implications of Robotics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 187 (but one of the online versions 
available at ssrn.com/abstract=1599189, last visited 6 December 2016). In the footnotes of this 
article, the page number of the cited work will be the one of the online version. 
31 B. Gates, ‘A Robot in Every Home’ Scientific American, 58 (2006), describes robotics as 
the first technological revolution after computers; indeed ‘we may be on the verge of a new era, 
when the PC will get up off the desktop and allow us to see, hear, touch and manipulate objects 
in places where we are not physically present.’ 
32 Regio decreto 30 March 1942 no 327. It has been amended several times, most recently 
by decreto legge 12 September 2014 no 133, converted with amendments by legge 11 November 
2014 no 164, which has introduced Art 733 bis. See also decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 
15 February 1952 no 328 ‘Approvazione del Regolamento per l’esecuzione del Codice della 
navigazione’ (maritime navigation regulation), last amended by decreto legislativo 12 May 2015 
no 71, which has amended Art 271, para 2, no 2. 
33 ‘Disposizioni correttive ed integrative al decreto legislativo 9 maggio 2005 n. 96, 
recante la revisione della parte aeronautica del codice della navigazione’. 
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legislation in this field.’34  
The regolamento ENAC includes, therefore, implementation of this 
provision and denotes a scope that is narrower than what is indicated by Art 
743. It concerns two species of RPASs: remotely piloted aerial vehicles and 
model aircrafts. The former are RPASs ‘operated or intended to be operated 
for specialised operations or for experimental, scientific or research activities’ 
(Art 1 para 3 regolamento ENAC) and fall within the scope of the codice della 
navigazione. The latter are not regarded as aircraft for the purposes of the 
provisions of the codice della navigazione and can be used for recreational 
and sporting activities only. Nevertheless, the regolamento ENAC sets out 
specific provisions and limitations applicable to the use of the model aircraft 
to ensure the safety of persons and property on the ground and of other 
airspace users. Moreover, pursuant to the EU regulation no 216/2008,35 
RPASs of operating take-off mass not exceeding one hundred fifty kilograms 
and those designed or modified for research, experimental, or scientific 
purposes fall under the competence of ENAC.36 
A notable provision is Art 5 (Glossary and acronyms), which looks very 
peculiar to civil law scholars.37 It is useful to report on the distinction 
between RPAS and autonomous systems. A RPAS is 
 ‘a system consisting of an aerial vehicle (remotely piloted aircraft) 
 
34 According to the traditional approach of legal scholars, the concept of aircrafts under 
criminal law does not cover RPASs. Consequently, Art 428 of the codice penale (criminal code) 
does not apply. Under Art 428 it is punished with the imprisonment from five to twelve years 
whomever causes the wreck or submersion of a ship or other saling means, or the fall of an 
aerial vehicle, which do not belong to the person who caused the said events. Cf E. Battaglini 
and B. Bruno, ‘Incolumità pubblica (delitti contro la)’ Novissimo Digesto italiano (Torino: 
Utet, 1962), VIII, 552 and C. Erra, ‘Disastro ferroviario, marittimo, aviatorio’ Enciclopedia del 
diritto (Milano: Giuffrè, 1963), XIII, 4. However, in favour of a broad interpretation see C. 
Medina, ‘Aeromobile’ Novissimo Digesto italiano (Torino: Utet, 1980), appendix I, 119. The 
translation of the provision is provided by ENAC in the courtesy version referred to above. 
35 Art 2 para 2 regolamento ENAC refers to ‘Regulation (EC) no 216/2008 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of 
civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council 
Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC’. See 
namely Art 4 para 4 and letter i) of Annex II. 
36 Equally, the regolamento ENAC does not apply to a) State RPASs (Arts 744, 746 and 
748 of the codice della navigazione); b) RPASs operating within indoor space (but to fly over 
gatherings of persons during parades, sports events, or different forms of entertainment or any 
areas where there is an unusual concentration of people, is prohibited); c) Balloons used for 
scientific observations or tethered balloons.  
37 The codice dell’ordinamento militare includes a notable exception, where it introduces 
an ad hoc section to definitions. For present purposes, one need only refer to Art 246 of the 
ordinamento, where it provides that a RPA is an aerial means piloted by a crew that operates 
from a remote command and control station, thus excluding completely autonomous systems 
also from military avionics. 
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without persons on board, not used for recreation and sports, and the 
related components necessary for the command and control (remote 
ground pilot station) by a remote pilot.’  
In turn, an autonomous system is a RPAS that does not allow the pilot 
intervention in the management of the flight on a real time basis. It falls 
outside the scope of the regolamento. 
It is rather self-explanatory that the main risks, especially in terms of 
liability, come from the latter. Therefore, it is a commendable decision to 
leave this use unregulated, while progress in terms of the security of 
autonomous systems is not yet advanced enough. However, risks are present 
also in the current system, particularly when it comes to Beyond Visual Line 
Of Sight (BVLOS)38 and Extended Visual Line Of Sight (EVLOS)39 operations. 
Notwithstanding the above definition, I claim that one should not draw 
a clear line between robots, drones, and human beings. Thanks to artificial 
enhancement techniques, human beings are becoming more and more 
similar to machines. At the same time, machines are becoming increasingly 
more similar to human beings, both in their aspect and in their sensing and 
actuating capabilities. Therefore, one should view the considered phenomena 
as a continuum of machine to human being.40 
The last caveats are of a methodological nature. First, whereas common 
law scholars are relatively used to studying unconventional legal documents, 
the tradition of civil law (especially the one guarded by the civilisti)41 frowns 
 
38 BVLOS are ‘operations at a distance that do not allow the remote pilot to continuously 
remain in direct visual contact with the RPA, that do not allow him to manage the flight, to 
maintain separation and avoid collisions.’ (Art 5 para 1 regolamento ENAC). 
39 EVLOS are operations at a distance exceeding the limits of the Visual Line of Sight 
(VLOS) operations, which comply with the VLOS conditions via alternative means. In principle, 
the safest operations should be the VLOS ones: ‘operations at distances, both horizontal and 
vertical, in which the remote pilot maintains continuous visual contact with the aerial vehicle, 
without the aid of tools to enhance the view, so to be able to directly control it with the aim to 
conduct the flight and to meet separation and collision avoidance responsibilities.’ (Art 5, para 
1, regolamento ENAC). Distances by which operations can be considered VLOS are subject to 
the capability of the pilot to be aware of the actual RPA conditions in terms of position, altitude, 
and speed as well as of obstacles and other aircraft. The remote pilot has the final responsibility 
to define the VLOS conditions that might be affected by weather conditions, sunlight, and the 
presence of obstructions. 
40 This assertion is far from being widely accepted. Just to name an example, the Court of 
Justice has stated that ‘when citizens move, they do so as human beings, not as robots. They 
fall in love, marry and have families.’ (Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de 
l’Emploi (ONEm), [2011] ECR I-1177) This may be true now, but it is likely to become incorrect 
in a near future. 
41 Although there are many notable exceptions, the Italian academy has traditionally 
focused on the Costituzione, the leggi, and kindred primary legislation. Many scholars tend 
even to diminish the role of case law. To be precise, I still think that leggi, codici, and 
judgements are the patricians of the law-poietic society, but one ought to look at the 
microhistory à la Braudel, being aware of the actual, albeit rarely formalised, influence that the 
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upon studies focused on secondary legislation and soft law. In the age of 
global law and legal hysteresis,42 the scholar has to abandon the cathedral43 
and walk the unbeaten path of guidelines, circolari, codes of conduct, terms 
of service, and even press releases, hardware designs, and algorithms.44  
The proliferation of legal sources and legal inflation have been described 
as the reasons for the defeat of both Antigone and Creon.45 I do not know if 
the regolamento ENAC and the galaxy of robot law is the last expression of 
these phenomena. However, I do know that heterodox norms are affecting 
people’s lives and their violation is punished, even in informal and privately 
enforced ways;46 therefore, they ought not to be overlooked. 
As a conclusive methodological (and ideological) caveat, one should 
point out that, when it comes to binomial-technology law, legal scholars tend 
either to declare that we are facing a revolution (a disruptive innovation)47 
and traditional principles will not apply, or to affirm that the technology is 
 
plebeians had on history. 
42 See G. Noto La Diega, ‘In Light of the Ends. Copyright Hysteresis and Private Copy 
Exception after the British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors (BASCA) and 
Others v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills Case’ Studi giuridici europei 
2014, 39, (2016). 
43 Cf G. Calabresi and A.D. Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral’ 85(6) Harvard Law Review, 1089, 1090, fn 2 (1972), who recognise, 
with mirable humility and foresight, that their approach is only one of Monet’s paintings of the 
Cathedral at Rouen: ‘to understand the Cathedral one must see all of them’ (the reference is to 
G.H. Hamilton, Claude Monet’s Paintings of Rouen Cathedral (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1960), 4-5, 19-20, 27). 
44 With ubiquitous computing, the law is increasingly implemented in technological ways, 
which suggests, inter alia, to adopt a multisciplinary methodology. The most common example 
is the privacy by design approach followed by the general data protection regulation (GDPR). In 
G. Noto La Diega, ‘Uber Law and Awareness by Design. An Empirical Study on Online Platforms 
and Dehumanised Negotiations’, Revue européenne de droit de la consummation, II, 383, 
(2016), I suggest an awareness by design mobile application. 
45 It is the opinion expressed by L. Ferrajoli, ‘Antigone e Creonte, entrambi sconfitti dalla 
crisi della legalità’ Giustizia civile, I, 27 (2014). As is common knowledge, Antigone represents 
justice and Creon represents certainty. Cf T. Ascarelli, ‘Antigone e Porzia’ Rivista Internazionale 
di Filosofia del Diritto, 756 (1955) translated by C. Crea in this Journal, II, 167 (2015). 
46 Rating agencies grades are the most obvious, albeit not the only, example of this trend. 
One could also think of the policies of the main social networks: to be excluded by the platform 
(for instance due to the real name policy) may soon be perceived as an aquae et igni interdictio. 
See Hamburgische Beauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit, Anordnung of 24 
July 2015 and Verwaltungsgericht Hamburg, Beschluss of 3 March 2016, 15 E 4482/15, 
available at http://justiz.hamburg.de/contentblob/5359282/data/15e4482-15.pdf (last visited 
6 December 2016). More generally, the role of online platforms in oligopolistic markets – with 
a focus on consumers and not only on competitors – should be the subject of future research. 
47 For a critique to Clayton M. Christensen’s idea of disruptive innovation (first sketched 
in his The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press, 1997)), see A.A. King and B. Baatartogtokh, ‘How Useful Is the 
Theory of Disruptive Innovation?’ MIT Sloan Management Review (2015), available at 
http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/how-useful-is-the-theory-of-disruptive-innovation/ (last visi- 
ted 6 December 2016). 
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not actually new, but is just ‘die erzwungene Vernichtung einer Masse von 
Produktivkräften’;48 that is, the problems may be old, but old barrels are 
suitable for new wine. It is the perennial conflict between apocalyptic and 
integrated.49 This article stands for a middle way and advocates a problem-
based multidisciplinary approach, whereby one should assess whether the 
technology at issue is new and how and whether the existing (if any) legal 
framework can accommodate the emerging problems. Whilst the psychological 
and social consequences of the increasing deployment of robots and drones 
might justify, to some extent, a nihilistic approach,50 the same does not 
apply to law. The dynamic combined action of interpretation of the existing 
legal framework, soft law tools (especially co-regulatory ones) and enforcement 
by design can provide the solution. Beware of whoever relies entirely on the 
law or, alternatively, on technology: neither will suffice with autonomous 
robots and drones becoming commonplace.  
 
 
III. Machine-Related Inventions and Machine-Generated Works 
Intellectual property is a critical aspect that must be addressed when it 
comes to contemporary machines. To make two general remarks: first, 
proprietary models can hinder interoperability, which is vital to the 
interaction between (and sometimes the functioning itself of) most machines 
in an Internet of Things era. Moreover, many machines can be carried by the 
user in several jurisdictions, and intellectual property, given the principle of 
territoriality, can constitute an obstacle in the access to the service provided 
by the machine, especially as long as geo-blocking is not tackled properly.51 
Research commissioned by the World Intellectual Property Organization52 
 
48 Building on the idea of ‘enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces’ expressed 
by K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (London: Bildungs-
Gesellschaft für Arbeiter, 1848) I, read at https://www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/marx- 
engels/1848/manifest/1-bourprol.htm (last visited 6 December 2016), J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (London: Routledge, 1994, 1942), 82-83, developed the theory of 
the schopferische Zerstörung, the creative destruction.  
49 Cf U. Eco, Apocalittici e integrati. Comunicazioni di massa e teorie della cultura di 
massa (Milano: Bompiani, 1964). A balanced position has been recently expressed by L. Floridi, 
‘Should we be afraid of AI?’ Aeon (2016), available at https://aeon.co/essays/true-ai-is-both-
logically-possible-and-utterly-implausible (last visited 6 December 2016). 
50 I am studying the right to solitude in a context of ubiquituous computing, but an 
already studied, albeit still interesting, phenomenon is the so-called uncanny valley. Cf M. 
Mori, ‘Bukimi No Tani – The Uncanny Valley’ Energy, IV, 33 (1970). 
51 On 25 May 2016, the European Commission has adopted the Proposal for a regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on addressing geo-blocking and other forms of 
discrimination based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment 
within the internal market and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/ 
22/EC (COM(2016) 289 final). 
52 C.A. Keisner, J. Raffo, and S. Wunsch-Vincent, ‘Breakthrough Technologies – Robotics, 
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has shown that the countries with the highest number of patent filings are 
Japan, China, Republic of Korea and the US. Businesses in the car and 
electronics sectors file the most, but medical technologies and the Internet 
are growing in importance. Copyright protection is relevant too,53 mainly in 
its role in protecting computer programmes and netlists. 
In this paragraph, I will touch on intellectual property through the prisms 
of machine-related inventions and machine-generated works.54 
In Italy, as in most European countries, computer programmes per se 
are copyrightable, but they cannot be patented. Indeed, under Art 2 of the 
legge 22 April 1941 no 633 (‘Protezione del diritto d’autore e altri diritti 
connessi’, hereinafter also ‘copyright act’), computer programmes are protected 
as literary works under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works, ratified and implemented by the legge 20 June 1978 no 
399, regardless of how they are expressed, provided that they are original, 
being the outcome of the author’s intellectual creation. In turn, the codice 
della proprietà industriale (decreto legislativo 10 February 2005 no 30), 
which regards mainly inventions, designs, and trade marks, clarifies that 
computer programmes are not inventions and, therefore, cannot be patented 
(Art 45, para 2, letter b). Lastly, when it comes to registered designs, Art 31 
specifies that the concept of product whose design can be registered 
encompasses its components, but it openly excludes the software components.  
Nonetheless, the patentability exclusion regards only computer 
programmes per se (as such, ‘in quanto tali’, under Art 14 para 3 of the 
codice della proprietà industriale). This phrase refers to the constantly 
growing world of the computer-implemented (or computer-related) 
inventions which – we claim – would be better named machine-related, 
because their scope is broader than the one identified with traditional 
computers. (For instance software implemented in a wearable device can 
easily qualify as a machine-related invention). A machine-related invention 
involves the use of a computer, computer network or other programmable 
apparatus (that is, also robots and drones), where one or more features are 
realised wholly or partly by means of a computer programme.  
Since nearly all machines are equipped with computer programmes, the 
growth of the former will result in the spread of machine-related inventions. 
Indeed, these kind of inventions are a critical topic in patent law, since a too-
 
Innovation and Intellectual Property’, Economic Research Working Paper No 30 (2015). 
53 Cf M. de Cock Buning, ‘Is the EU Exposed on the Copyright of Robot Creations?’ The 
Robotics Law Journal, 8 (2015). 
54 There are several other intellectual property issues when it comes to machines. For 
instance, nowadays, sporting events are recorded by smart cameras and drones, equipped with 
slow motion features, high-definition videos, etc. In this context, the original contribution of 
the director is of a quality that renders it difficult to deny copyright protection. Cf S. Longhini 
and F. Catanzaro, ‘Tra il dire e il fare c’è di mezzo … il piratare’ Diritto d’autore, I, 72 (2014). 
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relaxed approach in granting patents for these kind of inventions may risk 
allowing a double protection for computer programmes: copyright and 
patents. A much too broad monopoly would be legitimised, with a subsequent 
increased propertisation of intangibles. 
The protection of computer programmes has always been a much 
debated topic: whether to protect them, how to protect them, using copyright, 
patents, both? The European Patent Convention excludes the patentability of 
computer programmes claimed as such (Art 52(2)(c) and (3)).55 Patents are 
not granted merely for programme listings, which are protected by copyright. 
If a technical problem is solved in a novel and non-obvious manner, a 
machine-related patent can be granted.56  
Computer program/computer program product is one of the trickiest 
categories. The European Patent Office (EPO), indeed, stresses the (unclear) 
difference between this category and computer programmes as a list of 
instructions: the subject matter is patentable  
‘if the computer program resulting from implementation of the 
corresponding method is capable of bringing about, when running on a 
computer or loaded into a computer, a “further technical effect” going 
beyond the “normal” physical interactions between the computer 
program and the computer hardware on which it is run.’57 
 
55 In an attempt to address whether case-law concerning excluded matter is settled, and 
derive uniformity of application of European patent law, the President of the EPO referred four 
questions on the patentability of computer programs to the Enlarged Board of Appeal in 
October 2008 (G3/08, opinion on 12 May 2010, available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice 
/case-law-appeals/pdf/g080003ex1.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016)). However, the Board 
concluded that the referral was inadmissible because the decisions referred to were not 
considered to be divergent, and declined to answer the questions beyond determining their 
admissibility. This led to the Court of Appeal reaffirming its view that practice was not yet 
settled in HTC Europe Co Ltd v Apple Inc (Rev 1) [2013] EWCA Civ 451 (3 May 2013) at 44.  
56 The machine-related inventions do not receive a stricter assessment in comparison to 
other inventions. Indeed, in EPO Board of Appeal, T 1606/06 (DNS determination of 
telephone number/HEWLETT-PACKARD) of 17 July 2007, EP:BA:2007:T160606.20070717, 
the appellant argued that, since the patent concerned a CII, the triviality test should have been 
stricter. According to the Board, there is no basis for doing so and ‘(t)he only “special” treatment 
for computer-implemented inventions relates to aspects or features of a non-technical nature; 
in fact this treatment is only special in the sense that the presence of non-technical features is a 
problem which does not arise in many fields.’ 
57 European Patent Office, ‘Patents for software? European law and practice’ (2013), 
available at documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/a0be115260b5ff71c125746d 
004c51a5/$FILE/patents_for_software_en.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016). For a landmark 
case of the Board of Appeal see T 1227/05 (Circuit simulation I/Infineon Technologies) of 13 
December 2006, EP:BA:2006:T122705.20061213, available at https//www.epo.org/law-practice 
/case-law-appeals/pdf/t051227ep1.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016), whereby ‘technical and 
inventive Specific technical applications of computer-implemented simulation methods, even if 
involving mathematical formulae, are to be regarded as “inventions” in the sense of Article 
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Mischievous commentators may argue that machine-related inventions 
are a surreptitious way to obtain a double binary for software protection. 
This may become true with the rise of machines, especially in the context of 
the Internet of Things. Indeed, with the gradual substitution of old machines 
with connected devices, we will face an unprecedented growth of machine-
related inventions; therefore, asserting that computer programmes are not 
patentable in Europe may sound hypocritical. I predict that in the future most 
computer programmes will be embedded in machines, with the consequential 
patentability of most computer programmes under the label of machine-
related inventions. 
The second IP-related aspect I will briefly touch on regards machine-
generated works (more commonly known as computer-generated works). 
Machines can already create copyrightable works without any human 
intervention or with little human input.58 Let us think, for example, of the 
weather images created by a machine directly in communication with a 
satellite. With machines becoming more and more autonomous, machine-
generated works will increase, leading scholars to rethink the traditional 
solutions for the relevant authorship, usually revolving around the developer 
of the software and the user operating the machine. In Italy, whilst it is 
believed that machine-generated works are protected as long as they are 
distinct from the computer programme that generated them,59 the legislature 
has not taken a position on their authorship,60 whereas in other countries 
 
52(1) of the European Patent Convention. Circuit simulations possess the required technical 
character because they form an essential part of the circuit fabrication process.’ The most 
recent EPO case regarding computer programmes is T 1722/11 of 18 December 2015 on an Apple 
Inc’s application for a ‘Method and system for message delivery management in broadcast 
networks.’ It is available at https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t111722eu 
1.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016). As Fox LJ stated in Merrill Lynch’s Application [1989] 
RPC 561, 569, ‘it cannot be permissible to patent an item excluded by section 1(2) [of the 
Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988] under the guise of an article which contains that 
item – that is to say, in the case of a computer program, the patenting of a conventional computer 
containing that program. Something further is necessary.’ 
58 I am taking into consideration only pure machine-generated works. There are already 
umpteen websites and apps offering tools to edit (sometimes radically) the photos uploaded by 
the user. I will not cover this kind of works, but let us just say that usually authorship and 
ownership will be vested on the user, but the latter is required to grant a very broad licence to 
the service provider. For instance, under s 3 of the Snapchat’s Terms of Service (effective as of 
29 March 2016, available at https://www.snapchat.com/l/en-gb/terms (last visited 6 December 
2016)), the user must grant Snapchat ‘a worldwide, royalty-free, sublicensable, and transferable 
licence to host, store, use, display, reproduce, modify, adapt, edit, publish, and distribute that 
content.’ It is arguable that such a broad licence is not very different from a proper transfer of 
ownership. 
59 And, of course, as long as the other copyright requirements occur, for instance 
originality. Cf B.M. Gutierrez, La tutela del diritto di autore (Milano: Giuffrè, 2008), 43. Cf, in 
general, V. Ercolani, ‘Computer-generated works’ Diritto d’autore, 604 (1998). 
60 One could be mislead by Art 7 para 2 of the copyright law. Indeed, it provides that the 
author of the elaborations is the elaboratore, which in Italian means both computer and 
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there are ad hoc provisions on the subject. For instance, in the UK, a 
computer-generated work is defined as one generated in circumstances when 
there is no human author of the work (s 178 of the Copyright, Designs, and 
Patents Act 1988) and under s 9(3) of the Act, which concerns literary, 
dramatic, musical or artistic works that have been computer-generated, the 
author is the person who made the necessary arrangements to create the 
work, such as the program author.61  
The regime in the UK seems to exclude that the author can be the 
machine itself, which could be unfair when proper superintelligence becomes 
a reality. Given that there is no ad hoc provision in Italy and given that the 
Italian copyright act does not limit the concept of author to humans,62 one 
could argue that the Italian regime is more suitable for an AI scenario,63 
since it allows machines to be authors and hence owners of the works they 
produce.64 
 
 
IV. Inner Eye. Privacy, Data Protection, and Security 
It is hard and probably useless to propose a unitary discourse on robots 
and drones when it comes to privacy and data protection. Therefore, I will 
take a concentric circles approach by analysing the genus and then assessing 
whether the same rules apply to the species. 
As the first Asimov law of robotics reads, ‘a robot may not harm a human 
being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.’ Even 
though the reference was originally to physical arms, nowadays one of the 
 
person who does the elaboration. The impression of an authorship attributed to the machine is 
soon dispelled by the first para of the same article, which clarifies the scope of the provision: 
collective works. See Consiglio di Stato 21 January 1993 no 77, Giustizia civile, I, 1125 (1993). 
61 Cf Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd & Ors (CA) [2007] EWCA Civ 219. 
62 Under Art 8 para 1 of the copyright act, the author is the entity (not necessarily the 
human being) who is indicated to be the author according to custom or, who is mentioned to 
be the author in the acting, execution, performance, or broadcasting of the work. Thus it is 
important to read the contracts or the terms of service to undertand who is the author. 
63 An ad hoc regime or a revision of the current general regime would be needed to 
accommodate the specific characteristics of the works generated by machines. For instance, 
machines do not die, therefore the usual duration system (seventy years after the death of the 
author) would be unsuitable. One could either provide ad hoc mechanisms (eg the British 
system, with the machine-generated works falling into the public domain after fifty years from 
the date they had been made), or the rise of machines could constitute a good opportunity to 
review the current system by, for instance, limiting the duration of copyright to the author’s 
lifetime. 
64 Given the current development of AI, it is still valid the theory of P. Samuelson, 
‘Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works’ 47 University of Pittsburgh Law 
Review, 1185 (1985), whereby it is more convenient to consider the user as the original owner 
of the work (even though one should assess on a case-by-case basis the individual contribution 
of the user). 
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main risks of the deployment of robots and drones is the threats to citizens’ 
privacy.65  
It ought to be said that the relationship between robots and privacy is 
amphibious. Not only can robots jeopardise privacy, but they can also protect 
it. The existence of the latter is somehow usually ignored.66 There are several 
commercial offers for security robots,67 such as Knightscope K5, allegedly an 
autonomous68 ‘force multiplier, data gatherer and smart eyes and ears on 
the ground helping protect your customers, your property and your 
employees 24/7.’69 Making use of cloud computing,70 it patrols geo-fenced 
areas randomly or based on a particular patrolling algorithm and is defined 
as a ‘marked law enforcement vehicle’.71 It is noteworthy that Knightscope’s 
motto is ‘hardware + software + humans’ and it is explained by observing that  
‘(h)umans are best at decision-making and situational analysis, 
while our technologies excel at monotonous, computationally heavy and 
sometimes dangerous work’.72  
This approach is likely to be overcome soon, when the company deploys 
the new version equipped with object recognition tools and machine learning 
algorithms.73 Finally, under K2’s privacy policy, the personal and non-
personal data collected by the robots may be shared for law enforcement 
purposes ‘if we are compelled to by a court order’.74 Elsewhere, however, the 
 
65 According to ComRes, ‘Big Brother Watch – Online Privacy’, 31 March 2015 available at 
http://www.comres.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Big-Brother-Watch_UK-Tables_9- 
March-2015.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016), seventy-eight per cent of the one thousand 
respondents are very concerned or at least fairly concerned about privacy online. The axiological 
statute of privacy in Italy may well be inferred by the Dichiarazione dei diritti in Internet (the 
charter of rights in the Internet) of 14 July 2015, whereby Art 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU (Protection of personal data) ‘costituisce il riferimento necessario per una 
specificazione dei principi riguardanti il funzionamento di Internet, anche in una prospettiva 
globale’ (preamble). See also Arts 5-11 of the Dichiarazione.  
66 Along the same lines, see R. Calo, n 30 above, 3, whereby ‘vulnerable populations such 
as victims of domestic violence may one day use robots to prevent access to their person or 
home and police against abuse.’ 
67 See, eg, http://robotsecuritysystems.com/ and http://www.irobot.com/For-Defense-
and-Security.aspx#PublicSafety (last visited 6 December 2016). 
68 Autonomous at least in the double sense of non-remotely-controlled and capable of 
charging itself. 
69 http://knightscope.com/ (last visited 6 December 2016).  
70 It comes with a browser-based web application, with no downloading of black box 
software required. 
71 n 69 above. 
72 Ibid. 
73 B. Schiller, ‘Meet the Scary Little Security Robot That’s Patrolling Silicon Valley’, 13 
August 2015, available at http://www.fastcoexist.com/3049708/meet-the-scary-little-security-
robot-thats-patrolling-silicon-valley (last visited 6 December 2016). 
74 Section 5 of the Knightscope Privacy Policy, last modified on 13 August 2015, available 
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company admits that they may also proactively report the user and release 
its information ‘without receiving any request to third parties where we 
believe that it is proper to do so for legal reasons’75 (at least they will not do 
so for illegal reasons). It is debatable that all the sections of the policy and of 
the terms of service are enforceable, for example when the former reads ‘(i)f 
you have submitted information to our Site you will be unable to edit that 
information’.76 Moreover, K5 shares data with third party individuals and 
organizations, including contractors, web hosts, ‘and others’77 and gives 
them the right to ‘collect, access, use, and disseminate your information’.78 
Therefore, it would be preferable to have the company bind third parties to 
confidentiality agreements, especially given that the user is forced to agree 
‘not to hold (the company) liable for the actions of any of these third parties’79 
and that the third parties will not ask for the user’s consent when processing 
its data.80 
On the other hand, the potential for privacy-threatening uses are 
considerable. Robots can interact with human beings (‘human-robot 
interaction, or HRI), with other robots, and with the environment overall;81 
they are equipped with sensors to perceive reality and can process and store 
big data, especially due to the developments of cloud robotics.82 The main 
categories of robots are military, industrial, and service: each of them can be 
used to monitor people, acquire their data, and make decisions from the data. 
Robots can see and hear better than human beings and can go where 
human beings cannot, with resistance and memory capabilities that are 
increasingly superior to human capabilities.83 In principle, drones can 
 
at http://knightscope.com/terms-conditions/ (last visited 6 December 2016). The scope of the 
section is not clear, since the following sentence reads ‘(a)dditionally, you agree that we may 
disclose your information if we reasonably believe that you have violated US laws or the terms 
of any of our agreements with you or if we believe that a third party is at risk of bodily harm.’  
75 Ibid, section 9. 
76 Ibid, section 6. Cf Art 7 para 3 letter a) of the codice della privacy (decreto legislativo 30 
June 2003 no 196), whereby data subjects have the right to have their data up-to-date, to 
rectify them, and complete them. All the Member States have a similar provision on the right to 
amend one’s personal data. 
77 Ibid, section 8. 
78 Ibid, section 8, italics added. 
79 Ibid, section 8. 
80 Ibid, section 8. 
81 Cf T. Fong et al, ‘A Survey of Socially Interactive Robots’ 42 Robotics and Autonomous 
Systems, 143-166 (2003). 
82 Cf P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st 
Century (London: Penguin, 2009) and T. Denning et al, ‘A Spotlight on Security and Privacy 
Risks with Future Household Robots: Attacks and Lessons’ 11th International Conference on 
Ubiquitous Computing (New York: ACM Press, 2010). 
83 According to B.J. Fogg, Persuasive Technologies: Using Computers to Change What 
We Think and Do (Burlington: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc, 2003), 8, ‘(c)omputers don’t 
get tired, discouraged, or frustrated. They don’t need to eat or sleep. They can work around the 
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constitute an even more dangerous threat to privacy and data protection 
because in principle they can move more than robots. However, this is not 
always the case, not only because the distinction between robots and drones 
is blurred (for example, the Shigeo Hirose Ninja can climb, thanks to a suction 
cup system), but also and most importantly because robots are likely to 
become familiar components of our everyday life. Consequently, even in the 
event robots were not anthropomorphic, one would feel free to behave and 
talk in front of them as if they were family. 
A society of machines and surveillance might easily recall Orwell’s 1984. 
It is, however, possible to suggest some similarity with Kafka’s The Trial.84 It 
is arguable that the problem of contemporary life is the lack of knowledge as 
to whether information will be used against us. Incidentally, this may be 
confirmed by the incredible fortune of the Google Spain ruling85 on the so-
called right to be forgotten. 
Nonetheless, I have the feeling that our scenario is rather Orwellian. In 
fact, we are not capable of assessing the degree of control to which we are 
subject throughout our lives, thanks to the combined use of new technologies 
and bad laws.86 I suggest everyone use Lightbeam, a Firefox add-on that 
enables users to see who is tracking them. The consequent shock may worsen 
once users realise that the tool is limited to the tracking that is carried out via 
cookies. 
Surveillance capabilities and the possibility of accessing private spaces 
make drones and robots an unprecedented threat to privacy. Indeed,  
‘the home robot in particular presents a novel opportunity for 
government, private litigants, and hackers to access information about 
the interior of a living space’.87  
 
clock in active efforts to persuade, or watch and wait for the right moment to intervene.’ 
84 D. Solove, ‘The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Digital Age’ 36 GWU Law 
School Public Law Research Paper no 121 (2004). 
85 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (European Court of Justice Grand Chambre 13 May 
2014). Cf A. Mantelero, ‘The Protection of the Right to Be Forgotten: Lessons and Perspectives 
from Open Data’ Contratto e Impresa / Europa, II, 734 (2015); Id, ‘Il futuro regolamento EU sui 
dati personali e la valenza ‘politica’ del caso Google: ricordare e dimenticare nella digital 
economy’, in G.Resta and V. Zeno-Zencovich eds, Il diritto all’oblio su Internet dopo la sentenza 
Google Spain (Roma: Roma-Tre Press, 2015), 125; A. Viglianisi Ferraro, ‘La sentenza Google 
Spain ed il diritto all’oblio nello spazio giuridico europeo’ Contratto e impresa/Europa, 159 
(2015). 
86 The increasing importance of cloud robotics enables me to refer to G. Noto La Diega, 
‘Cloud computing e protezione dei dati nel web 3.0’ available at http://giustiziacivile.com/sogg 
etti-e-nuove-tecnologie/approfondimenti/cloud-computing-e-protezione-dei-dati-nel-web-30 
(last visited 6 December 2016), where I stress, inter alia, the problem that there is no technical 
means of ensuring that no one is accessing our data on the cloud. 
87 R. Calo, n 30 above, 2. Even before robots and drones, it was possible to gather personal 
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A hacker who accesses our computer can steal data, but a hacker who 
accesses a robot can map the house, record the habits of the inhabitants, and 
be remotely controlled so as to steal physical properties without the risk of 
being caught. It is not a coincidence that law enforcement agencies are 
increasingly making use of robots.88 
Robots, and especially service robots, are becoming commonplace, thanks 
to increasing competition and a decrease in prices. Houses are being invaded 
by computers with legs (and sometimes wings) – machines usually connected 
to the Internet and capable of collaborating with other machines – due to 
cloud technologies. Public authorities, competitors, hackers, as well as the 
parties to a trial, can have access to the big data gathered by these machines, 
especially if they transmit information to or through the cloud. The relevant 
data are big in quantity and (potentially) personal in quality. Robots are 
increasingly equipped with sophisticated infrared cameras, Global Positioning 
System (GPS), accelerometers, sonars, electronic noses,89 etc. 
The issues are not different from those we are observing in the context 
of the Internet of Things. One need only consider the possibility of remotely 
activating the microphone in a car without the driver knowing it.90 Similarly, 
one can intercept the audio-visual flows processed by robots and remotely 
control their moves, as well as orientate the sensors and the cameras. 
Moreover, every robot can be (and increasingly is) a component of a network 
of connected devices, which provides a formidable chance to third parties 
willing to recombine the information produced by the devices in order to 
exploit it for commercial purposes.91 
One of the reasons why privacy is critical in every robotic scenario is that 
the internal memory of the machines is limited, whereas they need a fair 
 
information – for instance, via webcams. However, nowadays there are more tools to gather 
and analyse information, thus changing the quantity and quality of the data themselves. 
88 See N. Sharkey, ‘2084: Big Robot is Watching You. Report on the Future of Robots for 
policing, surveillance and security’ (2008), available at https://www.scribd.com/doc/13997174 
6/Noel-Sharkey-2084-Big-robot-is-watching-you-Future-Robot-Policing-Report-Final 
(last visited 6 December 2016). 
89 Cf, eg, N. Schactman, ‘Drones See, Smell Evil from Above’, available at https://www.wi 
red.com/2003/03/drones-see-smell-evil-from-above/ (last visited 6 December 2016) and J. B. 
Chang and V. Subramanian, ‘Electronic Noses Sniff Success’ IEEE Spectrum (2008), available 
at http://spectrum.ieee.org/biomedical/devices/electronic-noses-sniff-success/ (last visited 6 
December 2016). 
90 This fact is cited by J. Zittrain, The Future of the Internet: And How to Stop It (New 
Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2008), 110. 
91 One need only think of the problem of cross-device tracking through advertisements 
that cannot be heard by human beings, but which enable the identification of the devices which 
are part of the relevant network. It is not coincidental that the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has organised a workshop on the topic. See C. Calabrese et al, ‘Comments for November 
2015 Workshop on Cross-Device Tracking’ (2015), available at https://cdt.org/files/2015/11/1 
0.16.15-CDT-Cross-Device-Comments.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016). 
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amount of processing and storing resources, especially with the diffusion of 
artificial intelligence technologies. Therefore, traditionally, ‘lacking the 
onboard capability to process all of the data, the robot periodically uploads it 
the manufacturer for analysis and retrieval’.92 This leads to the issue of cloud 
robotics. 
Cloud robotics enables, inter alia, potentially infinite storing and 
processing capabilities. Therefore, there is not necessarily the need to send 
over the information to the manufacturer (which usually retains this 
possibility), since the information is sent to the cloud provider (which is usually 
a third party). Cybersecurity in the cloud is becoming sound, especially thanks 
to the latest developments of homomorphic encryption; consequently, one can 
rely on the currently deployed clouds. As a recommendation to lawyers 
drafting cloud robotics contracts, it is critical to address encryption, 
redundancy, and geo-location of servers through ad hoc contractual sections. 
Cloud servers are often outside Europe, which can cause problems in 
terms of jurisdiction, applicable law, and, recently, legality of the transnational 
transfer of personal data. The legal basis for the transfer of European 
personal data to the United States had always been the so-called Safe 
Harbour agreement, which was nearly automatically integrated in most of the 
contracts with big transnational corporations. Mostly as a consequence of 
Snowden revelations and kindred scandals, the Court of Justice has declared 
this international agreement void,93 which has created a situation of utter 
uncertainty. In order to fully overcome the uncertainty, one should wait for 
the full effectiveness of the EU-US Privacy Shield.94 
 
92 R. Calo, n 30 above, 8. 
93 Case C-362/14 Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (European 
Court of Justice Grand Chamber 6 October 2015) available at www.eurlex.europa.eu. According 
to A. Mantelero, ‘The “medieval” sovereignty on personal data. Considerations on the nature 
and scope of the EU regulatory model’, available at http://bileta2016.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/o3/Mantelero-Alessandro.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016), only in appearance would 
the Schrems case reaffirm the strength of the European protection of personal data, ‘but 
actually unveils the frail nature of this regulatory wall: the ECJ judgment has pointed out the 
inadequacy and the limits of the different remedies available to legitimate trans-border data 
flows and, therefore, the frailness of the apparent EU supremacy in protecting personal data.’ 
Cf G. Resta, ‘La sorveglianza elettronica di massa e il conflitto regolatorio USA/UE’ Il diritto 
dell’informazione e dell’informatica, 697-718 (2015). 
94 On 2 February 2016, the EU and the US agreed on a new framework for transatlantic 
data flows: the EU-US Privacy Shield. The College of Commissioners has mandated Vice-
President Ansip and Commissioner Jourová to prepare a draft adequacy decision, which should 
be adopted by the College after obtaining the advice of the Article 29 Working Party and after 
consulting a committee composed of representatives of the Member States. In the meantime, the 
US side will make the necessary preparations to put in place the new framework, monitoring 
mechanisms, and new Ombudsman. The draft adequacy decision (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ 
data-protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy-decision_en.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016)) 
and the text of the Privacy Shield (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-sh 
ield-adequacy-decision-annex-2_en.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016)) were presented on 29 
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Service robots, however, are not merely home robots. Robots are 
increasingly used in commercial contexts, such as the robotic shopping 
assistants first used in Japan and now becoming commonplace in Europe 
and America. Like a human shopping assistant, this robot identifies the 
potential client and drives him or her towards the product. However, unlike 
the human, the robot can record all of the information produced during the 
(attempted) transaction, crunch big data, and identify a customer who is 
returning (for example through the use of face-recognition technologies).95 
The resulting data can be exploited ‘in both loss prevention and marketing 
research’.96 
Shifting to the applicable law, one should move from Directive 2006/42 
(machinery directive),97 implemented in Italy through decreto legislativo 27 
January 2010 no 17 (decreto macchine). 
Art 18 of the machinery directive provides a regime that juxtaposes with 
the general data protection rules.98 The directive calls on the Member States 
to ensure that the people involved in its application do not disclose confidential 
information, such as trade, professional, and commercial secrets.99 However, 
there is awareness of the central role of the balance of opposed interests; 
therefore, the disclosure of confidential information is allowed when the 
health and security of people require it. 
 
February 2016. On 13 April 2016, Article 29 Working Party adopted its ‘Opinion 01/2016 on 
the EU – US Privacy Shield draft adequacy decision’, thus pointing out that further clarification 
of the adequacy decision is in order. According to Commissioner Jurova, the ‘European 
Commission is set to present a new draft of its data-exchange pact with the US, the Privacy 
Shield, in early July.’ (N. Nielsen, ‘EU to adopt new US data rules in July’, available at 
https://euobserver.com/justice/133941 (last visited 6 December 2016)). 
95 On face recognition and machines see, for instance, Article 29 Working Party, opinion 
27 April 2012 no 3 on the development of biometric technologies. On 5 May 2016, the District 
Court of Northern California rejected Facebook’s motion seeking dismissal of a complaint filed 
under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. Some users of the social networking 
platform complained that the collection and storage of biometric data derived from their faces 
in photographs, for the purposes of tag suggestions, were illegal. The decision is available at 
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Biometric-Ruling.pdf (last visited 
6 December 2016). 
96 R. Calo, n 30 above, 4. 
97 The wording of the machinery directive is broad enough to encompass the vast majority 
of robots and drones. Some applications, however, may be excluded. See, for instance, 
machinery that is also a medical device, hence subject to the Medical Devices Directive 
93/42/EC. 
98 On 4 May 2016, the GDPR was published on the Official Journal. See Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 of the Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC. It must be transposed by 25 May 2018, but it does not need 
acts of implementation. 
99 The listed types of information do not have a clear classification. In some countries they 
may fall under intellectual property, and in other systems under data protection and privacy. 
In Italy, I argue that they would be closer to the intellectual property realm. 
2016]                                                          Machine Rules                                                      388 
         
It is not a lex specialis which applies instead of the general regime (it 
does not derogat generali). It adds to it. Indeed, Art 14 of decreto macchine 
is clear where it reads that the application of the code of privacy and of decreto 
legislativo 10 February 2005 no 30 (codice della proprietà industriale) is not 
affected. The domestic provision reproduces verbatim the European one, but 
the privacy is not balanced only with the health and security of people. The 
balance encompasses also the security of pets, goods, and the environment 
as a whole. 
The Italian legislature might have been braver by introducing stronger 
privacy protections. However, the existing regime can be interpreted in a 
more privacy-friendly way. The manufacturer can determine that the machine 
does not threaten security and health before putting it on to the market. 
These data must be part of the technical attachment (Art 3, para 3, decreto 
macchine). The annex I of the directive clarifies the essential security 
requirements. The manufacturer must assess the limitations of the machine, 
including the foreseen usage and reasonably foreseeable incorrect usage. 
Now, my suggestion is that the limitations to be assessed have to 
encompass privacy and data protection. The measures to be enacted in order 
to avoid an incorrect usage of the machine have to include the so-called 
privacy by design and privacy by default approaches that have become 
binding, due to the general data protection regulation (GDPR).100 Without 
being naive, it is clear that these measures can only minimise, rather than 
eliminate the risks. However, the annex I is ready to face this scenario. If the 
measures by design do not eliminate all the risks, the manufacturer has to 
adequately inform the customer.  
As to the mentioned technical attachment, it must include the documents 
related to risk assessment and give account of the essential requirements of 
security and health, as well as of the protection measures embedded, in 
order to avoid risks where possible and clarify the remaining risks. As a policy 
recommendation, the data protection impact assessment (DPIA)101 needs to 
 
100 Under Art 25 para 1 GDPR, ‘(t)aking into account the state of the art, the cost of 
implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks 
of varying likelihood and severity for rights and freedoms of natural persons posed by the 
processing, the controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means for 
processing and at the time of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-
protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the 
necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation 
and protect the rights of data subjects.’ 
101 Under Art 35 para 1 GDPR, ‘(w)here a type of processing in particular using new 
technologies, and taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the 
processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the 
controller shall, prior to the processing, carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged 
processing operations on the protection of personal data. A single assessment may address a 
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become a compulsory tool for manufacturers of machines, be they robots, 
drones or the devices of the Internet of Things. Now, Art 15 of the decreto 
macchine provides fines for placing on to the market products inconsistent 
with annex I or products without the required technical attachment. Even 
though privacy and data protection can be interpreted as already included in 
the concept of security, I recommend that the legislature expressly state it 
and impose the DPIA (whilst the privacy by design and by default measures 
have become compulsory, thanks to the GDPR).  
Shifting to drones, a communication of the European Commission on 
civil RPASs102 is one of the main relevant documents.103 The European 
strategy stresses the need for a public debate on societal concerns, that is, 
namely, data protection, privacy, liability, insurance, and security.104 At a 
closer look, its para 3.4, entitled ‘Protecting the citizens’ fundamental rights,’ 
is a sort of handbook on privacy in a drone context. The Commission 
recognises that some civil RPAS applications can jeopardise privacy; 
therefore, the operators of RPASs must respect the European privacy 
regimes.105 The communication goes on to point out that the processing of 
data must always be carried out for a legitimate purpose. The creation itself 
of a market for RPASs is held dependent on the assessment of the appropriate 
measures to protect the fundamental rights, such as data protection and 
privacy. There is more. The Commission underlines that there shall be a 
constant monitoring of data protection.  
Even if the Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali (Garante) does 
 
set of similar processing operations that present similar high risks.’ 
102 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
‘A new era for aviation – Opening the aviation market to the civil use of remotely piloted 
aircraft systems in a safe and sustainable manner’, COM/2014/207, para 3. 
103 Cf also the communication of 13 February 2008 on ‘Examining the creation of a 
European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, COM/2008/68 final, whereby many 
activities, such as the monitoring of frontiers by using UAV ‘may involve the processing of 
personal data. Thus the principles of personal data protection law applicable in the European 
Union are to be observed, meaning that personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully, 
collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way 
incompatible with those purposes. The processing of personal data within the context of 
EUROSUR must therefore be based on appropriate legislative measures, which define the 
nature of the processing and lay down appropriate safeguards.’ (Para 5). 
104 Com. 2014/207 final, para 3. 
105 The reference was to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, now repealed by the GDPR and to the 
Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, now repealed by Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data. The directive must be transposed 
by 6 June 2018. 
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not seem to have taken clear steps in the matter of machines, things are 
moving. One should mention two recent facts.  
On the one hand, it ought to be mentioned that in April 2016, twenty-
eight data protection authorities launched the ‘Privacy Sweep 2016’. It is an 
international survey coordinated by the Global Privacy Enforcement Network 
and it aims to assess the relation between the Internet of Things and privacy. 
Its results will be of great relevance also in the robotics sector. 
On the other hand, the Garante has recently ruled106 in favour of the use 
of smart closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs) for access control and surveillance. 
It is noteworthy that the Garante authorises the processing on the ground 
that the requesting company was following an ISO standard. It is recognised 
that, even though standards are not legally binding provisions, they concern 
areas of critical public interest, which are technologically very complex. 
Therefore, public bodies endorse them increasingly and there is a long-
standing practice to refer to standards in contracts. Consequently, one cannot 
deny that ‘actually, one recognises in these technical specifications a statute 
which is considerably higher than the one they should have, given their 
adoption procedures’. The Garante concludes that such security standards 
have become, nationally and internationally, an inescapable reference point 
in high-tech markets. 
The European Commission committed itself to launch consultations in 
order to assess how RPAS applications can be consistent with data protection. 
I am not aware of any such consultation, at least not one that has involved 
civil society. However, the Commission has sought some institutions’ advice. 
It is worth mentioning the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)’s 
opinion.107 EDPS stresses that ‘only those RPAS that will have integrated 
data protection and privacy in their design will be well regarded by society at 
large’.108 According to the EDPS, most of RPAS applications process personal 
data, due to the broad scope of application and technologies in use.109 Things 
get trickier when it comes to the full adoption of technologies, such as 
machine learning, that are leading to the creation of autonomous machines. 
Some observations, then, would need an update. For instance, according 
to the EDPS, the European data protection regime is applicable ‘as long as the 
processing takes place in the context of the activities of an establishment of 
 
106 Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali (Garante or GPDP) 17 March 2016 no 127 
on ‘Verifica preliminare. Sistemi di videosorveglianza dotati di software “intelligent video” ’. 
107 EDPS, Opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on ‘A new era for aviation - Opening the aviation market to the civil 
use of remotely piloted aircraft systems in a safe and sustainable manner’, 26 November 2014. 
108 Ibid, para 10. 
109 EDPS refers to the example of a camera with video processing software; it could be 
capable of high power zoom, facial recognition, behaviour profiling, movement detection, and 
number plate recognition.  
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the controller in the EU or with equipment or means located in the EU’.110 
As stated by the Court of Justice in Weltimmo,111 the absence of a physical 
establishment and even of any equipment in the territory of the European 
Union is immaterial, insofar as there is evidence that the service is targeted 
at a Member State (for example, if a website is translated into a certain 
language). 
The RPAS are usually compared to airplanes and CCTVs. According to 
the EDPS, however, drones constitute an even higher threat to privacy. Even 
though an airplane can be equipped with sensors and technologies far more 
refined than those of drones, the latter fly closer to the human being, and 
thus able to catch more personal data. The main difference between drones 
and CCTVs is the former’s mobility, which ‘offers more and also increasingly 
different uses.’ Mobility and stealth make drones a perfect surveillance tool.  
As stated by the European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover v 
Germany,112 the fact that certain activities are carried out in public does not 
exclude, in principle, any expectation of privacy. In fact, there is ‘a zone of 
interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall 
within the scope of private life’.113 For instance, a citizen would have the right 
not to be targeted by zooming cameras and directional microphones, 
regardless of the public or private nature of the setting. 
For what concerns private activities, for example for hobby purposes, 
the EDPS espouses a restrictive interpretation of the personal and domestic 
use exception (Art 3, para 2, second hyphen of directive 95/46/EC).114 This 
is in line with the subsequent ruling in František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu 
osobních údajů,115 where the Court of Justice found that the European 
privacy regime applies to the recording carried out by a private surveillance 
camera installed in a house and directed to a public path. On this point, the 
EDPS refers to Lindqvist116 and infers that the processing of personal data 
carried out by private subjects does not fall within the said exception,117 
 
110 EDPS, n 107 above, para 31. 
111 Case C‑230/ Weltimmo s.r.o. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság 
Hatóság (European Court of Justice Third Chamber 1 October 2015), available at www.eurlex. 
europa.eu. 
112 Eur. Court H.R., Von Hannover v Germany, Judgement of 24 June 2004, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2004-VI, on Princess Caroline of Munich and her attempts to 
prevent the publication of pictures of her private life on tabloids. 
113 Ibid, para 97. 
114 The reference was Directive 95/46/EC. The relevant provision of the GDPR is Art 2 
para 2 letter c, which repeats verbatim the wording of the directive. 
115 Case C-212/13 František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů (European Court 
of Justice Fourth Chamber 11 December 2014), available at www.eurlex.europa.eu. 
116 Case C-101/01 Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, [2003] ECR I-12971. 
117 According to Article 29 Working Party, when assessing the household exception, one 
needs to take into consideration ‘- if the personal data is disseminated to an indefinite number 
of persons, rather than to a limited community of friends, family members or acquaintances, - 
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when it is aimed 
 ‘at sharing or even publishing the resulting video/sound 
captures/images or any data allowing the direct or indirect identification 
of an individual on the Internet and, consequently, to an indefinite 
number of people (for instance, via a social network)’.118 
Moreover, as to the commercial and administrative use of drones, 
Google Spain119 justifies an extraterritorial application of the GDPR. It 
follows that even the manufacturers of RPASs that are established outside the 
European Union need to embody data protection by design and by default 
measures, as well as to adopt a DPIA. 
Finally, a couple of recommendations. The European Commission has 
no jurisdiction on RPASs under one hundred and fifty kilograms. Yet, the 
manufacturers of small RPASs need to be aware that the privacy and data 
protection regimes still apply. Moreover, it is important to raise customers’ 
awareness; therefore, I suggest carefully drafting privacy notices to be 
included with the packaging of drones. 
More recently, the Article 29 Working Party120 has issued its opinion ‘on 
Privacy and Data Protection Issues relating to the Utilisation of Drones’.121 
The Article 29 Working Party calls on policy makers and regulators so 
that the deployment of civil drones is accompanied by several measures. Let 
us only mention the need to make the authorisation to fly dependent on 
declarations of the assessment of the impact on data protection, as well as 
the invitation to draft DPIAs by liaising with stakeholders. 
 
if the personal data is about individuals who have no personal or household relationship with 
the person posting it, - if the scale and frequency of the processing of personal data suggest 
professional or full-time activity, - if there is evidence of a number of individuals acting 
together in a collective and organised manner,- if there is a potential adverse impact on 
individuals, including intrusion into their privacy.’ See Annex 2, Proposals for Amendments 
regarding exemption for personal or household activities, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justi 
ce/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2013/20130227_statement_ 
dp_annex2_en.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016). 
118 EDPS, n 107 above, para 35. 
119 Case C-131/12 Google Spain n 85 above, particularly when it states that the exception 
must be interpreted ‘as meaning that processing of personal data is carried out in the context of 
the activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of a Member State, within 
the meaning of that provision, when the operator of a search engine sets up in a Member State 
a branch or subsidiary which is intended to promote and sell advertising space offered by that 
engine and which orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that Member State’ (para 60). 
120 The Article 29 Working Party is about to be substituted by the European Data 
Protection Board (see Art 68 GDPR). 
121 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 01/2015 on Privacy and Data Protection Issues 
relating to the Utilisation of Drones, 16 June 2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-p 
rotection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2015/wp231_en.pdf (last visited 
6 December 2016). 
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Manufacturers and operators, then, shall embody privacy by design and 
by default; adopt codes of conduct assisted by ad hoc remedies (in a sui 
generis co-regulation model);122 and render the drone identifiable (for 
example through wireless signals or bright colours).123 
Law enforcement agencies, finally, shall respect the principles of necessity, 
proportionality, and minimisation; inform the data subjects ‘as far as 
possible’;124 ensure that the continuous surveillance is covered by a warrant; 
as to the automated execution of decisions, ensure that a human operator 
controls the data processed by the drone. 
The Italian lex specialis is the regolamento ENAC. Its Art 34 is rather 
different from the wording of the above analysed provision of the machinery 
directive, inasmuch as it provides the following. First, when the RPAS 
operations involve (or can involve) the processing of personal data, this risk 
ought to be mentioned in the documents produced when applying for an 
authorisation. Second, the processing of personal data ought to be consistent 
with the code of privacy, especially with regard to adopting techniques that 
render the data subject identifiable only when necessary under Art 3 of the 
said code. The data processing, third, ought to follow the measures enacted 
by the Garante. It should also be noted that, in case of operations carried out 
on behalf of third parties, the regolamento mandates the parties to include 
provisions relevant to data protection (Art 7 para 3). 
Art 34 does not go beyond the mere reference to the general data 
protection regime. However, it is commendable that the Garante suggests 
what I have wished above with regard to the machinery directive, that is, the 
need for the documents accompanying the authorisation to cover privacy 
issues. The sensitiveness towards the trend of data minimisation is 
noteworthy.125 Lastly, the reference to the decisions of the Garante can be a 
dynamic and flexible tool, as the procedures of the authorities are simpler 
than those of the legislature.126 One should wish that the reference was 
 
122 The code of conduct is usually an example of self-regulation. However, in this context, 
it is accompanied by proper remedies, thus giving rise to a public-private collaboration which 
can be described as co-regulation. 
123 Given that the invisibility of drones is one of the reasons of their appeal, marketing 
considerations may lead to not enforcing this provision. 
124 Article 29 Working Party, n 121 above, para 5.4. 
125 Cf, eg, Article 29 Working Party, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) – Response 
to the Questionnaire, 16 December 2013, para 3, whereby a ‘need for policy guidelines has been 
identified in order to address the practical difficulties regarding the enforcement of some data 
protection rules regarding the use of data processing equipment onboard RPAS, for example 
fair processing, information notice, data minimization and compliance with data subjects’ access 
rights’. 
126 The Garante has not taken a position yet. However, there are many documents which 
are indirectly relevant to machines and privacy (see, in text, the reference to smart CCTV and 
the survey on the Internet of Things). On robots as internet bots see GPDP, opinion 4 July 
2013, doc. web no 2574977 on ‘Linee guida redatte dall’Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale ai sensi 
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extended also to EDPS and the Article 29 Working Party (and in the future 
to the European Data Protection Board). 
To conclude, there are three takeaways. First, machines can both help 
protect us from privacy threats, yet also constitute a threat themselves. 
Second, even though there seems to be more concern about drones, robots 
can be even more dangerous, because they are present in the most private 
spaces and they become a familiar component of the everyday landscape in a 
household. Third, existing legislation and regulations – in primis the code of 
privacy and the regolamento ENAC – are applicable even in the event of 
threats to privacy posed by robots and drones. However, on the one hand, 
the Italian legislature needs to amend the code of privacy to react to the 
GDPR, particularly regarding the DPIA, data protection by design and by 
default, and certifications.127 On the other hand, the Italian and European 
data protection authorities need to take machines seriously and hopefully 
the results of the survey on the Internet of Things will constitute a good step 
towards this direction. 
 
 
V. Torts, Contracts, and Special Regimes of Liability 
In late June 2016, Tesla announced that a man died while driving in 
autopilot mode because the sensors of the vehicle, which help to steer the car 
by identifying obstructions, had failed to recognise ‘the white side of the 
tractor trailer against a brightly lit sky’.128 The US National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration has just opened a preliminary evaluation into the 
performance of the autopilot, so it is too soon to reach any conclusions, but 
the first fatal crash of a (quasi)129 driverless car has reminded us all of the 
importance of the topic of liability. 
 
dell’art. 58, comma 2, del D. Lgs. 7 marzo 2005, n. 82 (CAD)’, especially para 5.5.2.3. Robots 
and bots, however, shall not be confused. 
127 Art 42 of the GDPR encourages the establishment of data protection certification 
mechanisms and of data protection seals and marks, for the purpose of demonstrating 
compliance with the regulation of processing operations by controllers and processors. 
128 The Tesla Team, ‘A tragic loss’, 31 June 2016, available at https://www.teslamotors.com 
/blog/tragic-loss (last visited 6 December 2016).  
129 The Tesla model S’s autopilot requires the driver to leave the hands on the steer, in 
order to allow them to contradict the machine’s decisions. In a case like this, Tesla could argue 
that the driver should have distinguished the white side of the tractor from the bright sky. 
Probably, the conclusion will be different with proper driverless cars. Since the tests are 
showing that mortality and accidents are by far less frequent with driverless cars, in 
comparison with human-driven cars, I believe that regulators should allow the deployment of 
this kind of machines, but they should clarify that manufacturers of cars are liable for driverless 
cars even in the case the driver (or their family) was not able to prove the manufacturers’ or the 
developer’s fault. Indeed, the manufacturer is the (economically and contractually) strongest 
actor in the supply chain and the one who can have a more direct control on the embedded 
software (for security reasons, driverless cars will likely be ‘closed’ systems), therefore a 
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From an Italian civil law perspective, the main general liability regimes 
that apply to machines are breach of contract (responsabilità contrattuale), 
torts (responsabilità extracontrattuale), and product liability. When it comes 
to drones, one should also take into account the special provisions of the 
regolamento ENAC and of the codice della navigazione. 
The responsabilità contrattuale is an objective liability, insofar as it 
does not require the proof of negligence or fault of the defendant. It derives 
from the inadempimento, the violation of an obligation (be it contractual or 
not) and it is accompanied by a large array of remedies, such as damages 
and specific performance. Machine contracts (that is, contracts created when 
buying a robot or a drone) may contain disclaimers of any liability, but such 
sections may not be enforceable, especially in business-to-consumer 
transactions.130 Moreover, there are specific provisions, such as Art 1494 
para 2 of the codice civile, regarding the seller’s liability for damages 
deriving from the defects of the sold good.131 A good use case is provided by 
the Unibox service provided by Octo Telematics Italia srl to the clients of the 
insurance company Unipol Assicurazioni spa. The company provides a black 
box equipped with several sensors that drivers install in their car in order to 
allow the insurance company to monitor their driving habits, while the driver 
can benefit from discounts on the insurance fee. As one can read in the 
Condizioni Generali del Contratto di abbonamento ai servizi (terms of 
service),132 the contract is a comodato – that is, a complimentary leasing.133 
 
presumptive strict liability regime should operate. 
130 The codice del consumo (decreto legislativo 6 September 2005 no 206) provides a 
higher level of protection to consumers; this results, for instance, in special remedies and in the 
restriction of the freedom of contract on the side of businesses. The codice del consumo has 
been amended several times, lastly by decreto legislativo 6 August 2015 no 130, which has 
transposed Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) 
No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR). 
131 Under Art 1490 of the codice civile, the seller shall guarantee that the sold good has no 
defects that render the good unsuitable for the designated use or that decrease its value 
substantially. However, the seller has two defences: either he proves that the buyer knew the 
defects, or he proves that the defects could easily be recognised. In the latter scenario, the 
buyer can rebut the evidence by showing that the seller has declared that the good had no 
defects (Art 1491). On the nature of this liability, see Corte di Cassazione 11 February 2014 no 
3021, in R. Mazzoni, Risarcimento del danno per inadempimento contrattuale (Sant’Arcangelo 
di Romagna: Maggioli, 2014), 276. 
132 Condizioni Generali del Contratto di abbonamento ai servizi Octo Telematics Italia 
srl, edition of 1 July 2011, available at http://www.unipol.unipolsai.it/utile-e-facile/preventivat 
ori/autoveicoli/Documents/05_Condizioni-Octotelematics_9533_PA002%20OCTO%20TEL 
EM.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016). 
133 Under Art 1803 of the codice civile, the comodato is an essentially complimentary 
contract whereby a party delivers a movable or immovable good to another party, so that the 
latter can use it for a limited time and specified purpose, with the duty to return the same thing 
they had received. 
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One of the relevant provisions of the codice civile reads that if the defects of 
the good damage the comodatario (the user), the comodante (the provider) 
shall compensate the loss, provided that the latter knew the defects and did 
not warn the former (Art 1812). 
It is harder for a claimant to be successful in a responsabilità 
extracontrattuale claim, since there are less favourable rules, especially on 
the burden of proof, causality link, and subjective element (for example, the 
dolo and colpa grave required by Art 2043 of the codice civile). The more 
complex regime is due to the fact that the damage occurs in a moment when 
there is not a qualified relationship between the claimant and the defendant. 
Furthermore, there are a number of specific provisions that can apply, 
depending on the characteristics of the specific dispute. For instance, Art 
2050 of the civil code creates a form of objective liability for those who carry 
out dangerous activities (responsabilità per esercizio di attività pericolose). 
Another provision that is potentially applicable is Art 2049 of the civil code, 
which deals with the liability of the owner and of the commissioner for the 
damages caused by the tort of the person under the former’s responsibility. 
Lastly, Art 2052 of the civil code regards the damages caused by things held 
in custody. 
Machines per se do not lead one to rethink these general liability regimes. 
Autonomy is the real question. The use of artificial intelligence is leading to 
the manufacturing of machines that can make autonomous decisions, learn 
from experience, and act in a way that was not foreseeable at the time of 
production. Currently, machines have no legal personality; therefore they 
cannot be subject to rights, enter into contracts, be bound by obligations, be 
condemned to pay damages, be arrested, etc. Nevertheless, for reasons I will 
explain in the conclusions, it is just a matter of time until we will have to 
recognise legal personality of machines.  
Nonetheless, let us deal with the current status of autonomy and the lack 
of personality. Even though the machine itself cannot be found liable, if no 
obligations bind the damaged person or the person behind the machine, it 
becomes harder and harder to spot a causality link when one faces 
autonomous decisions. Moreover, who is the person behind the machine? 
The manufacturer of the hardware? The developer of the software? What if 
the damage derives from the interoperability with third-party software and 
machines? 
A generalised system of compulsory insurance, along the lines of the 
responsabilità civile auto (mandatory car insurance), as well as a public 
debate on simpler and fairer contracts, should be the answers. In the meantime, 
the product liability regime134 may provide temporary and imperfect answers. 
 
134 The decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 24 May 1988 no 224 implemented 
Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
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This regime is imperfect mainly because it is limited to just some items of 
losses and only if they are the consequence of a defect. Moreover, it is not 
entirely clear what happens if the defect is to the software and not to the 
hardware component. Elsewhere,135 I have argued that the devices of the 
Internet of Things (and most robots and drones are subsumable under said 
category) are an inextricable mixture of hardware, software, and service. 
Consequently, I argue that even defects to software can give rise to product 
liability claims. As a policy recommendation, updates to the defective products 
directive and to the codice del consumo are much needed. However, the 
rules are still most suitable for when one deals with damages caused by 
machines because it is a strict liability regime.136 The burden to prove 
damages does not fall on the person actually responsible for the defect but 
falls presumptively on the manufacturer. However, these rules are still the 
most suitable when one deals with damages caused by machines, since it is a 
strict liability and does not impose on the damaged person the burden to 
find the single person actually responsible for the defect, thanks to a 
presumptive system revolving around the manufacturer. 
It is unclear whether the machinery directive and the decreto macchine 
apply to drones. They both leave out of their scope, inter alia, the means of 
transport by air. It is not certain whether all drones can be considered means 
of transport, but one should take these regimes into account because they 
undoubtedly apply to robots. 
From a liability perspective, the manufacturer (fabbricante) is at the 
centre. It is defined as the legal or natural person who designs and/or builds 
a machine: he is responsible for conforming to the decreto macchine (Art 2 
para 2 letter i). This regime comes with a notable array of remedies. For 
 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products 
(product liability directive). The current regime is provided by art 114 ff of the codice del 
consumo, which is completed by the health and safety regime provided by art 102 ff of the 
same codice. 
135 G. Noto La Diega and I. Walden, ‘Contracting for the ‘Internet of Things’: Looking into 
the Nest’ Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper no 219/2016, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2725913 (last visited 6 December 2016), now in European Journal 
of Law & Technology, 2016, II. 
136 As clarified by Corte di Cassazione 28 July 2015 no 15851, Danno e responsabilità, I, 
41 (2016), it is a presumptive regime, whereby one assumes the manufacturer’s fault, but it can 
still prove the inexistence of the defect (it is a colpa presunta regime, not a responsabilità 
oggettiva one). The Italian ruling is inconsistent with Joined cases C-503/13 and C-504/13 
Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt – Die Gesundheitskasse and 
Betriebskrankenkasse RWE (European Court of Justice Fourth Chamber 5 March 2015), 
available at www.eurlex.europa.eu, whereby Art 6(1) of the product liability directive must be 
interpreted as meaning that, where it is found that products belonging to the same group or 
forming part of the same production series have a potential defect, such a product may be 
classified as defective without there being any need to establish that that product has such a 
defect. 
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instance, unless the offence is criminal, the manufacturer or its agent 
(mandatario), which places the machine on the market without meeting the 
provided requirements of conformity, is fined with a sum up to twenty-four 
thousand euros. 
Shifting to the special regimes that are applicable to drones, the 
regolamento ENAC is relevant also with respect to liability, since it regulates 
the conditions of the flight and the role and responsibility of pilots, as well as 
the mandatory insurance137 (which it is not clear why should be limited to 
this kind of machine).  
In order to fly a drone, one needs the ENAC’s authorisation or a 
declaration of conformity.138 The main content of these documents is 
safeguards for security and safety, for the same reasons it is compulsory to 
have a flight manual. It is noteworthy that the RPAS has to be identified 
through a placard with information about the system and the operator. Since 
the identification is fundamental in order to be able to allocate responsibilities, 
this mechanism appeared rather inadequate. Therefore, the new version of 
the regolamento provides that, as of 1 July 2016, RPASs must be equipped 
with an electronic identity device, which enables the real-time transmission 
and recording of the data on the drone and on the owner/operator, alongside 
the basic flight data. 
The main person responsible appears to be the remote pilot.139 The 
remote pilot is defined as the person charged by the operator as responsible 
for the conduct of the flight, who commands the RPAS by manipulating the 
remote ground pilot station. This applies particularly to visual line of sight 
(VLOS) operations, where the remote pilot keeps continuous visual contact 
with the aerial vehicle, without the aid of tools to enhance the view, thus 
being able to control it directly with the aim to conduct the flight and to meet 
separation and collision avoidance responsibilities. The remote pilot has the 
final responsibility to define the VLOS conditions, which might be affected 
by the weather condition, the sunlight, or the presence of obstacles. It is their 
responsibility to ensure the continued compliance with the conditions for 
the experimental activity, which is an essential prerequisite for the critical 
operations. More generally, pursuant to codice della navigazione, ‘the pilot 
is responsible for the safe management of the flight’ (Art 20). 
 
137 Under Art 32 of the regolamento ENAC, ‘(n)o RPAS shall be operated unless it has in 
place a third party insurance, adequate for the operations and not less than the minimum 
insurance coverage of the table in Art. 7 of Regulation (CE) 785/2004 is in place for the 
operations.’ 
138 The dichotomy is between critical and non-critical operations. The former must be 
preceeded by an authorisation, and the latter by a declaration. 
139 However, see Art 28 of the regolamento, whereby ‘The operator, the manufacturer, the 
design organization, the pilot shall keep and make available to ENAC documents issued in 
order to demonstrate compliance with this Regulation, upon to their respective responsibilities.’ 
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The operator plays an important role in terms of prevention and security 
(Art 33). He shall put in place appropriate measures to protect the RPAS 
from unlawful acts during operations, including the prevention of unlawful 
interference with the radio link. Moreover, the operator shall establish 
procedures to prevent unauthorized access to the area of operations, with 
particular attention to the remote ground pilot station, and to the storage 
location of the RPAS. 
RPAS operations can be carried out on behalf of third parties. In this 
event, a contract between the RPAS operator and the client shall allocate the 
responsibilities for such specific operations. 
 Some remedies accompany the regolamento. For instance, ENAC can 
suspend authorisations and certifications if the regolamento is violated. 
Moreover, if one undertakes specialised operations without authorisation for 
critical operations or declaration of conformity, they shall be subject to the 
remedies provided by Arts 1174, 1216, 1228, and 1231 of the codice della 
navigazione. 
The second title of the third book of the codice is dedicated to the 
liability for damages to third parties both for what are known as surface and 
impact damages. Under Art 965, the esercente140 is liable for the damages 
caused by the aerial system to people and goods on the Earth’s surface, even 
in the case of force majeure. However, the esercente can still prove that the 
damage was the consequence of the harmed person’s fault. Moreover, the 
harmed person will not be entitled to damages if he could have avoided the 
injury or the loss by being diligent (Art 966). A cap to damages is provided, 
depending on the weight of the system (Art 967, but see Art 971 for the 
exclusion of the limitation) and it is excluded an overlap between this special 
tort141 liability and the contractual one. Indeed, Art 965 ff are not applicable 
when there is a contract binding the esercente and the harmed person (Art 
972). 
A second scenario is the impact damage (danno da urto) due to 
slipstream effects or a similar cause (Art 974). Unlike surface damages, in 
the event of force majeure or unforeseeable circumstances, no damages will 
be granted. It is irrelevant whether there has been a material collision between 
the aerial systems or between the aerial system and the moving ship. 
Lastly, Art 978 regards surface damages occurring from in-flight impact. 
 
140 The esercente is the person entitled to operate the aerial system. Under Art 874 of the 
codice della navigazione, the one who operates the aerial system has to declare it to ENAC, as 
well as record it in the Registro Aeronautico Italiano and on the Certificato di Immatricolazione.  
141 For instance, the right to damages lapses after one year from the day of the loss or 
injury (Art 973 of the codice della navigazione). On the contrary, the general term of 
prescrizione for torts is five years, which is reduced to two years in case of vehicle traffic (Art 
2947 of the codice civile). The prescrizione for the second scenario (impact damage) is two 
years (Art 487 of the codice della navigazione). 
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For instance, what happens if two drones collide and, therefore, plummet to 
the ground, injuring a passerby? The esercenti are jointly and severally liable 
(responsabilità solidale). Therefore, the passerby is entitled to claim damages 
from each of them for the entire sum. The esercenti, then, will split the 
amount in proportion to the severity of fault and of the relevant consequences. 
If the accident occurred due to force majeure or if it is not possible to 
ascertain the fault or the severity of the respective faults (or of the 
consequences), the damages will be shared equally. 
The compliance with the regolamento and with the technical standards 
provide a good defence in liability claims, but it may not help when strict 
liability regimes apply. 
 
 
VI. ‘If This Is a Machine.’ Conclusions 
No contemporary discourse on machines can end without some words 
on autonomous systems and the future of the info-capitalist142 society. 
Recently,143 the polarisation of the debate between Singularitarians144 and 
AItheists145 has been underlined. The former are sure that true 
superintelligence is around the corner and it will disrupt everything we 
know, thus leading to an apocalyptic scenario where human labour will 
become useless and human beings will become the machines’ slaves. In turn, 
the latter argue that even imagining an intelligent machine is preposterous 
and, in any case, no real disruption will come, since we will able to keep 
machines under our control. The author of the Singularitarians/AItheists 
classification proposes a more nuanced approach, but ultimately he affirms 
that real AI is utterly implausible and invites intellectuals to focus on more 
important issues. 
It is probably true that both positions are incorrect and I have dealt with 
the current legal issues because I cannot see proper superintelligence146 
happening in the next few years.147 However, I am quite sure that AI will 
 
142 I use info-capitalism to focus on a major aspect of the so-called biocapitalism; that is, 
the mass exploitation of personal data, big data, and, more generally, information. 
143 L. Floridi, n 49 above. 
144 For those who are not familiar with this kind of literature, the reference is to K. 
Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: Viking, 
2006). An eminent intellectual belonging to this class is Stephen Hawking, who said that ‘the 
development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race.’ (R. Cellan-
Jones, ‘Stephen Hawking warns artificial intelligence could end mankind’ (2014), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-(last visited 6 December 2016)).  
145 See, eg, J.R. Searle, ‘What Your Computer Can’t Know’ The New York Review of Books 
(2014). 
146 On a caveat against the anthropocentrism underlying expressions such as artificial 
intelligence, smart city, etc, please see G. Noto La Diega, n 9 above, fn 1. 
147 Cf, eg, W.E. Halal, ‘Artificial Intelligence Is Almost Here’ On The Horizon – The 
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happen, for at least four reasons.  
First, machines have been constantly, sometimes exponentially, increasing 
– far faster than human beings. Let us think what a computer could do fifty 
years ago and what a human being could do. If we think of the development 
of the latter, it is mainly due to the use of machines.  
Second, big transnational corporations are massively investing in AI 
technologies148 and governments149 are increasingly interested in this realm. 
One may suppose that this is related to the potential of AI in terms of 
predictive analytics, profiling, and surveillance.  
Third, it is wrong to assume there is a before and an after of AI: AI is 
already happening150 and it is doing so incrementally. This is due mainly to 
the fact that we are growing over-dependent on machines. Consider our 
addiction to smartphones.151 The British check their smartphones fifty times 
a day, adding up to more than two hours of staring at the screen.152 
Moreover, if one has a smartphone, one is quite likely to be constantly 
connected to Facebook.153 As pointed out by a survey of four thousand 
respondents in thirty countries, the  
‘most fascinating aspect of the adoption of the smartphone is the 
extent to which it has become not just our primary access to digital 
sources, but an ever more comprehensive and capable remote control to 
life’.154  
 
Strategic Planning Resource for Education Professionals, II, 37 (2003) and the more realistic 
R. Kumar et al, ‘Prediction of Metabolism of Drugs Using Artificial Intelligence: How far Have 
We Reached?’, Current Drug Metabolism, II, 129 (2016). 
148 See, eg, the alarming H. Hodson, ‘Revealed: Google AI Has Access to Huge Haul of 
NHS Patient Data’ New Scientist (2016), available at https://www.newscientist.com/article/ 
2086454-revealed-google-ai-has-access-to-huge-haul-of-nhs-patient-data/ (last visited 6 
December 2016).  
149 For instance, on 3 May 2016, the White House announced a workshop series and an 
interagency working group on artificial intelligence. In particular, it is established a new National 
Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Subcommittee on Machine Learning and Artificial 
Intelligence; the first meeting will be in June 2016. 
150 Let us just think to Google’s Deepmind AlphaGo, which (who?) defeated the world’s 
best player of the boardgame Go. 
151 For a complementary aspect see E.H. Kwon et al, ‘Excessive Dependence on Mobile 
Social Apps: A Rational Addiction Perspective’ (2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2 
713567 (last visited 6 December 2016).  
152 See T. Tamblyn, ‘Brits Check Their Phones 50 Times a Day’ The Huffington Post 
(2015), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/05/07/brits-check-their-phones-
50-times-a-day-on-average_n_7233188.html (last visited 6 December 2016). 
153 International Data Corporation (IDC), ‘Always Connected to Facebook’ (2013) available 
at https://www.idc.com/prodserv/custom_solutions/download/case_studies/PLAN-BB_Alw 
ays_Connected_for_Facebook.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016). 
154 Deloitte, ‘Mobile Consumer 2015: The UK Cut Game of Phones’ (2015), available at   
http://www.deloitte.co.uk/mobileuk2015/assets/pdf/Deloitte-Mobile-Consumer-2015.pdf 
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In fact, the current dependence (and sometimes addiction) to machines 
is part of a clearly upward trend, due to the critical role played by the 
smartphone in the Internet of Things. 
Intertwined with the third reason is a fourth, which refers to 
Kahnemann’s theories on System 1 and System 2 of the brain.155 The Nobel 
Prize in Economics winner describes two ways the brain forms thoughts. 
System 1, which we use for tasks such as speaking our mother tongue is fast, 
automatic, frequent, emotional, stereotypic, and subconscious. When I 
speak Italian, I do not have to put considerable effort in building propositions 
and I can do other things at the same time. In turn, we use System 2 for 
complicated tasks, such as doing maths problems; this system is slow, 
effortful, infrequent, logical, calculating, and conscious. Its laziness is the 
fourth reason why proper superintelligence will be a reality. It is common 
experience that we started using calculators to save time and now most of us 
are incapable of doing maths, because we have delegated that chore to 
machines. Therefore, on the one hand we keep on delegating to machines 
tasks pertaining to System 2 (and consequently we demand that these 
machines are as accurate and intelligent as possible). On the other hand, the 
boundaries between System 1 and System 2 are shifting. One may assume, 
for instance, that reading in one’s mother tongue is clearly subsumable 
under System 1. Maybe surprisingy, it has been shown156 that only twenty 
per cent of the Italian population has mastered the minimal reading, writing, 
and calculating skills required to navigate contemporary society. 
When machines become truly intelligent, the legal discourse will have to 
change radically. We will not only be required to discuss which rights we 
have in terms of intellectual property, privacy, liability, etc. Indeed, we will 
have to recognise the legal personality of machines, and, accordingly, accept 
that they are entitled to rights and obligations. This will happen for several 
reasons. To name one: we are becoming machines ourselves. Even leaving 
aside artificial enhancement developments, it is already happening that if 
one is deaf, he can get an artificial ear; if one loses a limb, he can get a 
prosthetic one, or cells and tissues can be 3D printed; if one cannot see, 
biometric eyes will soon be found in shopping centres. Any traditionally 
human function will soon be potentially substituted by chips. It is hard to 
draw a clear line between a being who was born as a machine but now it is 
fully autonomous and a being who was born human but whose functions are 
entirely carried out by chips and other artificial substitutes. Since 
distinguishing between human beings and machines, human and artificial, 
legislators and regulators will no longer be able to discriminate on biological 
 
(last visited 6 December 2016). 
155 D. Kahnemann, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). 
156 T. De Mauro, ‘Analfabeti d’Italia’ 734 Internazionale (2008). 
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grounds. Therefore, real AI may have machines’ rights and machines’ 
obligations as the main consequence.  
If one must use Floridi’s dichotomy, I can be considered a Singularitarian 
in a moderate sense. I do believe that we will have true superintelligence,157 
but, at the same time, this will not lead to the apocalypse. I believe that 
machines will outclass us in all our tasks, but the horror vacui ought to be 
avoided: an unforeseeable society will come and we will not have to work in 
order to be able to live (at least, not work in the traditional sense of the 
word).158 For most academics’ happiness, usefulness will not be the 
benchmark of social value and mass unemployment will be a treat, as 
opposed to a threat.159 In the post-biocapitalist society, freed from the fight 
on the control of the means of production, human beings – granted that 
such a category will exist as separate from machines – will have the time to 
regain control of themselves and construct the foundation of a new 
society,160 which shall be more just for everyone, no matter how many chips 
and transistors they have in their body. 
 
157 A caveat always stands. Following the mostly still valid A.M. Turing, ‘Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence’ 59 Mind, 433 (1950), to pose the question, ‘can machines think?’ is 
absurd. 
158 Just a few years ago, who could have imagined that people could have earned a living 
by allowing others to watch them play videogames? See, for instance, the incredible growth of 
Amazon’s Twitch.tv, with more than one million five hundred thousand broadcasters and one-
hundred million visitors per month. 
159 Cf M. Ford, The Rise of the Robots – Technology and the Threat of Mass 
Unemployment (London: Oneworld Publications, 2015). 
160 I share the optimism of N. Srnicek and A. Williams, Inventing the Future: 
Postcapitalism and a World without Work (London-New York: Verso, 2015). 
